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Abstract
Previous research has sought to explain why people engage in prosocial behavior and under-
take activities that are costly to themselves and mostly benefit others, such as volunteering and
donating. My dissertation comprises three essays that collectively explore the determinants of
prosocial behavior and leverages insights from behavioral economics to design interventions to
nudge people to behave more prosocially. The first essay is an observational study that examines
how rapid demographic changes reduced informal volunteering but not formal volunteering in Sin-
gapore. The findings suggest that structural factors such as racial diversification and the availability
of institutions that promote inclusiveness could be more important than individual-level character-
istics in explaining prosocial behavior. The second essay is a field experiment that explores how
tailoring messages to resonate with peoples’ underlying motivations for volunteering can increase
their likelihood of actually volunteering. The third essay examines how behavioral modifications
to public engagement campaigns can increase their e↵ectiveness in changing behaviors. Overall,
the second and third essays suggest that actual volunteering behavior is the realization of interac-
tions between innate propensities to volunteer and situational factors. For example, non-volunteers
might have a lower predisposition for volunteering compared to current volunteers, but they can
still be nudged to volunteer if exposed to the appropriate type of messaging. Similarly, individuals
with high prosocial tendencies might never get around to volunteering because they procrastinate
or possess time-inconsistent preferences. We therefore have to account for situational factors in
order to develop a complete understanding of why people behave prosocially.
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Chapter 1
Demographic Changes, Social Cohesion and
Civic Engagement: The E↵ect of Racial
Diversification on Volunteering Behavior
We examine how racial diversification influenced social cohesion and civic engagement in Sin-
gapore, a racially heterogeneous, multicultural city-state that experienced a rapid influx of im-
migrants in the 2000s. We focus on formal and informal volunteering, two types of prosocial
behaviors. Formal volunteering refers to volunteering activity that occurs through participation
in an organization, whereas informal volunteering refers to volunteering activity that occurs in-
dividually outside an organizational context, such as helping one’s neighbors. We construct a
novel dataset that combines individual-level survey data on formal and informal volunteering with
neighborhood-level census data on racial demographics. We find that racial diversification reduced
the likelihood of informal volunteering but had no e↵ect on formal volunteering. Interestingly,
racial heterogeneity had no e↵ect on volunteering behavior. Our findings add a layer of nuance to
intergroup contact and racial threat theory by suggesting that it is the pace of racial diversification,
1
Chapter 1. Demographic Changes, Social Cohesion and Civic Engagement: The E↵ect of Racial
Diversification on Volunteering Behavior
rather than racial heterogeneity per se, that influences socioeconomic outcomes.
1.1 Introduction
Economic globalization has spurred increased migration from developing to developed countries
in the past decade, with the share of international migrants in developed countries rising from 8.7
percent in 2000 to 10.3 percent in 2010.1 The rapid influx of immigrants has transformed the de-
mographic composition of host nations within a short period of time. Such changes have arguably
strained the social fabric underlying many local communities, as cross-cultural clashes have fu-
elled concerns about the cultural impact of immigration and given rise to anti-immigrant sentiment
and exclusionary attitudes among the native-born populace (Enos 2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins
2014). Since global migration is expected to increase further2, understanding the implications of
changing demographics for social cohesion and civic engagement has become a key priority for
policymakers. Yet with the exception of (Hopkins 2009, 2010), most scholars have focused on
the level of racial diversity and its e↵ect on socioeconomic outcomes, rather than on changes in
the level of racial diversity. They find that racially diverse communities tend to be more fractured
— they are less supportive of welfare spending (Luttmer 2001), contribute less to public goods
(Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Habyarimana et al. 2007), partici-
pate less in formal organizations (Alesina and Ferrara 2000), and have lower levels of interpersonal
trust (Alesina and Ferrara 2002) and social capital (Costa and Kahn 2003; Putnam 2007; Laurence
2011). However, the e↵ect of racial heterogeneity also depends critically on contextual factors
such as institutional arrangements that promote inclusivity (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010), size of
the community (Aizlewood and Pendakur 2005; Clark and Kim 2012), socioeconomic status of the
1http://esa.un.org/migration/
2http://esa.un.org/migration/
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neighborhood (Letki 2008), and the pace at which the community is diversifying (Hopkins 2009,
2010). In other words, racial heterogeneity does not necessarily equate with lower levels of social
cohesion and civic engagement; the process by which communities became diverse also matters.
The true impact of racial diversification on socioeconomic outcomes is therefore unknown.3
Our study examines how racial diversification influenced social cohesion and civic engagement
in Singapore, a racially heterogeneous, multicultural city-state that experienced a rapid influx of
immigrants in the 2000s— the percentage of the foreign-born population rose from 25.9 percent in
2000 to 36.4 percent in 2010, an increase of 40.6 percent.4 Unlike previous work, our measure of
social cohesion and civic engagement focuses on volunteering, a type of prosocial behavior and a
form of public goods provision.5 Volunteering refers to activities undertaken freely to help others
outside one’s household, family, or relatives, without any expectation of financial compensation
(NVPC 2012). We further distinguish between two forms of volunteering: formal and informal.
Formal volunteering refers to volunteering activity that occurs through participation in an organiza-
tion, whereas informal volunteering refers to volunteering activity that occurs individually outside
an organizational context, such as helping one’s neighbors.
Overall, volunteers generate significant economic and social value for their communities. For
example, 64.5 million volunteers in the United States contributed an estimated $175 billion worth
of services in 2012;6 volunteers are also happier (Thoits and Hewitt 2001; Borgonovi 2008; Meier
and Stutzer 2008) and have more meaningful connections with their community (Chinman and
Wandersman 1999). Put di↵erently, volunteering encompasses participation in the civic life of
a community through formal organizations and informal social interactions and is an important
ingredient for developing crosscutting social bonds. It therefore serves as a good measure of the
3For an excellent overview on how racial diversity a↵ects economic outcomes, see Alesina and Ferrara (2005).
4http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/browse by theme/population.html
5Benabou and Tirole (2006) define prosocial behavior as “costly activities that primarily benefit others.
6http://www.volunteeringinamerica.gov/national
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level of social cohesion and civic engagement in a society.7
We construct a novel dataset that combines individual-level survey data on formal and infor-
mal volunteering from the 2012 Individual Giving Survey with neighborhood-level census data on
racial demographics from 2000 and 2010. We define racial diversification as the percentage change
in the proportion of racial out-groups between 2000 and 2010, and implement logistic regression
analyses to examine how neighborhood-level racial diversification influenced respondents’ likeli-
hood of engaging in formal and informal volunteering behavior in 2012.
The empirical findings suggest that racial diversification reduced the likelihood of informal
volunteering but had no e↵ect on formal volunteering. Specifically, a person living in an average
neighborhood that underwent racial diversification during the 2000s was 20.5 percent less likely to
engage in informal volunteering in the year 2012, compared to a person living in a demographically
static neighborhood. Interestingly, neighborhood-level racial diversity — the proportion of racial
out-groups — had no e↵ect on volunteering behavior.
Overall, our study extends the main findings from Alesina and Ferrara (2000), Costa and Kahn
(2003), and Putnam (2007) by examining the e↵ect of racial diversification — rather than racial
heterogeneity — on social cohesion and civic engagement, using a new set of data on volunteering
behavior in a non-Western context. The regression analyses suggest that racial heterogeneity low-
ers social cohesion and civic engagement, but only in communities that are rapidly diversifying.
Our findings add a layer of nuance to intergroup contact and racial threat theory (Allport 1954;
Blalock 1967; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Dancygier 2007) by suggesting that it is the pace of
racial diversification, rather than racial heterogeneity per se, that influences socioeconomic out-
comes. Initial contact with racial out-groups might incite fear and prompt exclusionary and prej-
udicial attitudes toward the other, but repeated exposure to and interaction with out-groups could
7See Rajulton, Ravanera and Beaujot (2007) and Letki (2008) for more on how volunteering can be used to measure
social cohesion.
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generate bridging and bonding social capital that mitigate these negative reactions over time Enos
(2014). Moreover, shared identities and common understandings that emerge from repeated in-
tergroup contact could serve as rallying points for inter-ethnic cooperation (Charnysh, Lucas and
Singh 2015). Policymakers should thus focus their e↵orts on integrating immigrants, rather than
excluding them.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theory on racial diversification
and its e↵ect on socioeconomic outcomes. Section 3 motivates the use of Singapore as a case study.
Section 4 presents the data and outlines the identification strategy for dealing with nonrandom
selection into residential neighborhoods. Section 5 presents the findings. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Racial Diversity, Racial Diversification, and Socioeconomic
Outcomes
1.2.1 Racial Diversity: Contact and Context
How does racial diversity influence social cohesion and civic engagement? Two prominent re-
search traditions in the social sciences have emerged to account for the aforementioned puzzle:
contact theory and contextual theory.
Contact theory posits that any type of proximate contact with racial out-groups is su cient
to trigger powerful psychological and emotional reactions that can result in negative changes in
peoples’ attitudes and behavior toward those racial out-groups.8 Such arguments revolve around
assumptions about the nature of individual preferences. People have a “natural aversion to hetero-
geneity” (Alesina and Ferrara 2000) and a “taste for discrimination” (Becker 1957); they derive
8Note that this hypothesis is more commonly known as racial/group threat theory. See Blumer (1958), Blalock
(1967), and Quillian (1995).
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positive utility from interacting with members of their own in-group and negative utility from in-
teracting with members of out-groups (Tajfle et al. 1971; Tajfle 1974; Miller and Brewer 1986;
Diehl 1990; Alesina and Ferrara 2000).9 Members of di↵erent groups could also hold divergent
preferences over socioeconomic outcomes, such as how public resources should be allocated to
benefit the social good (Habyarimana et al. 2007). Whatever the source of di↵erences in indi-
vidual preferences, the basic premise is that contact with out-groups induces fear of the “other”
and zero-sum competition over scarce resources, which in turn increases local levels of intergroup
hostility and prejudice (Blalock 1967; Dancygier 2007) and reinforces cooperative strategies that
benefit members within in-groups (Grief 1993; LaFerrara 2003). Put di↵erently, racial diversity
increases in-group solidarity and out-group exclusion, wrecking social cohesion by exacerbating
the divide between “us and them” and reducing trust between racial out-groups (Putnam 2007).10
Empirically, interracial contact results in lower levels of interpersonal trust and generalized reci-
procity (Glaeser et al. 2000), increased negative attitudes toward racial out-groups (Dustmann and
Preston 2001), reduced social capital (Putnam 2007), and lower rates of provision of public goods
(Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Habyarimana et al. 2007).
By contrast, contextual theory challenges the assumption that “primeval di↵erences” (Lee
2000) between racial groups condemn them to perpetual conflict whenever they meet and inter-
act. It instead argues that the e↵ect of intergroup contact depends crucially on the context under
which contact occurs; the contextual setting sets the tone and ground rules for how contact be-
tween members of di↵erent groups will be interpreted, as well as the utility that people derive
from intergroup cooperation.
Intergroup contact can generate positive attitudes toward out-groups when such encounters
9Alternatively, people have stronger warm glow(Andreoni 1989) or altruistic preferences toward others who are
similar to them. See Banfield (1958) and Bohnet and Frey (1999).
10Putnam (2007) also argues that racial diversity causes people to “hunker down” — they not only trust members
from racial out-groups less, but also have decreased levels of trust toward members of their own racial in-group.
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elicit stereotype-defying information about those out-groups (Allport 1954; Forbes 1997; Jackman
and Crane 1986; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Such a context is most likely to occur under the
following four Allport (1954) conditions: (1) equal status among groups, (2) common goals, (3)
a situation that requires intergroup cooperation, and (4) support of local authorities or institutions.
Empirically, scholars have found that interracial contact within a school environment — which
most closely resembles the Allport conditions — generates positive attitudes and a nity across
di↵erent racial groups (Laar et al. 2005; Sidanius et al. 2008; Rao 2013). Other types of contextual
environments also influence the e↵ect of racial diversity on attitudes and socioeconomic outcomes
— for example, the availability of institutions that promote inclusivity (Collier 2000, 2001; Kesler
and Bloemraad 2010); the size of the community (Aizlewood and Pendakur 2005; Clark and Kim
2012); neighborhood characteristics (Oliver and Wong 2003; Letki 2008); di↵erences in national
cultures (Gesthuizen, van der Meer, and Scheepers 2008, Ivarsflaten and Strmsnes 2013); the avail-
ability of a unifying superordinate identity that can facilitate intergroup cooperation, such as na-
tional identity (Robinson 2014); and the pace at which the community is diversifying (Hopkins
2009, 2010). The upshot is that racial heterogeneity does not necessarily reduce social cohesion
and civic engagement.
1.2.2 Racial Diversification and Socioeconomic Outcomes
We build on both contact theory and contextual theory to explain how racial diversification a↵ects
socioeconomic outcomes. Our theory of racial diversification acknowledges that people generally
prefer to interact with members of their own racial in-group and that racial groups often possess
divergent preferences. However, we question the implicit assumptions that racial identity is the
only salient identity for socioeconomic outcomes and that the boundaries of group identities — of
which racial groupings are an example — are fixed and unchanging. Identity groupings are social
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constructions and their salience and substance varies over time (Huntington 2004).11 Overall, we
argue that intergroup contact (racial heterogeneity) need not always result in increased social con-
flict, because repeated interactions across groups can foster the development of new, superordinate
identities that encompass a more inclusive definition of a common in-group. The rate of racial
diversification acts as a foil to the potentially pacifying e↵ects of repeated intergroup contact —
rapid racial diversification increases perceptions of racial threat (Blumer 1958) and the salience
of racial identity, thereby exacerbating the divide across racial groups and diminishing notions of
a shared identity and common future (Horton 1995; Kruse 2005; Lassiter 2006; Hopkins 2009,
2010). Such changes increase animosity across racial groups, lower interpersonal trust, and inhibit
interracial cooperation. Consequently, we predict that communities that are rapidly diversifying
will experience lower levels of social cohesion and civic engagement.
Repeated intergroup contact could reduce intergroup conflict and promote interracial cooper-
ation in several ways. Members of a minority out-group could gain acceptance into an existing
in-group by adopting certain characteristics of that in-group, such as learning their language or
embracing their cultural values. Alternatively, people could become used to the idea of co-existing
with others from racial out-groups (Enos 2014). Repeated interactions between members of dif-
ferent groups could also result in the creation of a new, all-inclusive superordinate identity. For
example, Huntington (2004) documents how American national identity has slowly expanded from
one defined solely in terms of race and ethnicity to one defined by shared values such as individ-
ualism, personal freedoms, and rule of law. The development of a common in-group identity can
reduce intergroup conflict by helping people shift from an “us versus them” mentality to a more
encompassing “we” mindset (Kramer and Brewer 1984; Gaertner et al. 1993, 1996; West, Shelton
11In our context, salience refers to the importance of racial identity relative to other identities (e.g., nationality,
gender), whereas substance refers to the criteria required for membership in an identity grouping (e.g., what does it
take for someone to be considered a fellow American?).
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and Trial 2009).12 Indeed, the development of a strong national identity has been e↵ective in fa-
cilitating cross-ethnic integration — increased national identification has strengthened interethnic
trust and interethnic cooperation (Robinson 2012), increased prosocial giving across inter-ethnic
groups (Charnysh, Lucas and Singh 2015) and economic redistribution (Shayo 2009), and reduced
the likelihood of interethnic conflict (Sambanis and Shayo 2013).
How does the rate of racial diversification influence socioeconomic outcomes? Consider two
previously identical, homogeneous communities that had opened their doors to the same number
of immigrants; both communities now have the same level of racial heterogeneity. Community A
received immigrants in drips and drabs and diversified gradually, whereas Community B received
immigrants en masse and diversified rapidly. Although immigration has altered the racial composi-
tion of both communities and introduced new identity groupings into the mix of social interactions,
we argue that levels of social cohesion and civic engagement are more likely to be lower in Com-
munity B than in Community A. For the reasons elaborated on above, initial intergroup contact
will reduce social cohesion and interpersonal trust, but repeated intergroup interactions could pro-
mote intergroup cooperation by: (1) producing stereotype-defying information about out-groups,
thereby reducing the threat perception of the other (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006); (2)
generating bridging and bonding social capital (Keser and van Winden 2000; Enos 2014); and (3)
fostering the development of new, superordinate identities (Kramer and Brewer 1984; Gaertner
et al. 1993, 1996; West, Shelton and Trial 2009).
However, the rate of racial diversification acts as a foil to the potentially pacifying e↵ects of
repeated intergroup contact. People generally pay less attention to the level of racial heterogeneity
than they do the rate of demographic change (Hopkins 2010). This is because the rate of racial
diversification a↵ects the likelihood and frequency with which people will come into contact with
12Note that the new superordinate identity can co-exist with the previous subordinate identity groupings. For ex-
ample, Asian Americans and African Americans can retain their cultural identities while sharing a superordinate
American national identity. See Dovidio and Gaertner (1999) and Hornsey and Hogg (2000).
9
Chapter 1. Demographic Changes, Social Cohesion and Civic Engagement: The E↵ect of Racial
Diversification on Volunteering Behavior
a member of a racial out-group within a fixed window of time; a high frequency of initial contact
with racial out-groups brings to the forefront of the majority group’s collective consciousness that
their community is undergoing significant change. These changes increase the salience of racial
identities and sharpen the perceived divide across racial groups, creating uncertainty within the
community about its shared identity and the viability of a common future, sparking fears about
intergroup competition and reducing levels of interpersonal trust (Horton 1995; Sugrue 1996;
Self 2003; Kruse 2005; Lassiter 2006; Hopkins 2009, 2010). The development of bridging and
bonding social capital across racial groups and the creation of new, shared identities require time;
rapid racial diversification undermines this process by chipping away at the slow-forming building
blocks of interracial cooperation.
1.3 Singapore as a Case Study
Singapore represents the ideal case study for two reasons: (1) it is a racially heterogeneous country
with a rich tradition of multiculturalism that experienced rapid racial diversification between 2000
and 2010; (2) the nature of its planned communities means that racial diversification is keenly felt
by local communities, because much of daily life revolves around the immediate neighborhood
where people live.
1.3.1 Racial Diversification in Singapore
Like any major city plugged into the global economy, Singapore is cosmopolitan and multicul-
tural, and has historically embraced immigrants with open arms. Its native population — made
up mostly of immigrants in the 1800s and 1900s — has traditionally comprised an ethnic Chinese
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majority of approximately 70 percent, along with Malay, Indian, and “other” ethnic minorities. 13
Prior to gaining independence in 1965, the di↵erent ethnic groups were segregated and resided in
ethnic enclaves. In the aftermath of bloody race riots between ethnic Chinese and Muslim Malays
in the 1960s, the Singapore government under Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew implemented several
policies designed to foster inter-ethnic cooperation and cohesion among its racially diverse popu-
lation. These policies included racial quotas for public housing estates to prevent racial clustering
and encourage interracial mixing; promotion based on merit rather than race; educational subsidies
to facilitate upward social mobility of minorities; o cial recognition and celebration of important
religious and cultural traditions; and expanding of sedition laws to censor hate speech that incite
racial conflict. Consequently, Singapore entered into a long period of peaceful co-existence among
its di↵erent racial groups, with no race riots occurring from 1969 to 2014. The upshot is that Sin-
gapore has lived with diversity throughout its entire history and has managed to thrive in spite of
it; racial heterogeneity does not always result in increased social conflict.
However, rapid racial diversification in the 2000s has arguably lowered social cohesion and
increased intergroup conflict. Beginning in the late 1990s, the Singapore government adopted an
open immigration policy as part of its long-term strategy to deal with an aging population and a
low fertility rate among its citizens.14 Singapore’s population grew rapidly from 4.3 million in
2000 to 5.1 million in 2010, with 77 percent of that change driven by immigration.15 The sudden
influx of immigrants also drastically altered the demographic composition of Singaporean society
and increased perceptions of crowdedness in land scarce Singapore – between 2000 and 2010, the
percentage of foreign-born residents rose from 25.9 percent in 2000 to 36.4 percent in 2010, an
increase of 40.6 percent; the population density rose by 28 percent to 7,146 persons per square kilo-
13http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/popn/population2012b.pdf
14See http://population.sg/whitepaper/resource-files/population-white-paper.pdf.
15See http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/latest data.html.
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meter.16 Anecdotal evidence suggests that these changes have resulted in increased cross-cultural
clashes and a rise in anti-foreigner sentiment in Singapore. For example, a cursory online search
reveals an outpouring of anti-immigrant sentiment on blogs and forums, with words like “foreign
trash” becoming increasingly commonly used17; seemingly minor incidences have become con-
flated with debates about foreigners and immigration18; Singapore experienced a labor strike by
bus drivers from Mainland China and a riot by foreigner workers in its Little India district, the first
in several decades.19 Anti-immigrant sentiment reached its zenith in 2013 after the government
released a Population White Paper outlining its plan to admit an additional 1.5 million immigrants
by 2030, which would raise the proportion of foreign-born residents to 45 percent. 20 Many
Singaporeans took to social media to vent their frustrations21 and to organize protests22, and the
government has responded to their concerns by reducing the number of foreign worker permits23
and the rate of population growth.24
Overall, the fact that Singapore is a racially heterogeneous country that experienced rapid de-
mographic change makes it an ideal case study for understanding how racial diversification in-
16For the 2013 figures on Singapores population density, see http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/latest data.html.
17For example, see http://therealsingapore.com/content/my-experience-foreign-talent-and-foreign-trash and http:
//www.tremeritus.com/2014/09/13/how-many-more-foreign-trash-are-there-in-nus/.
18See for example, what the media has dubbed the “Curry Wars”. Singaporeans were incensed after reading in the
local newspapers that a newly arrived immigrant family from China had lodged a complaint against a Singaporean-
Indian family over the smell emanating from the latters cooking of curry at home. Many Singaporeans took to social
media to organize curry cookout sessions to showcase their solidarity with the Singaporean-Indian family, with some
demanding that the new immigrant family return to China. See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
singapore/8704107/Singapores-anti-Chinese-curry-war.html.
19To read more about the bus strikes, see http://blogs.wsj.com/searealtime/2013/08/
26/the-strike-that-rattled-singapore-a-wsj-investigation/.For more information on the Lit-
tle India riots, see http://www.gov.sg/government/web/content/govsg/classic/factually/
factually-20131213-what-are-the-facts-of-the-rioting-incident-at-little-india-on-8-dec.
20http://population.sg/whitepaper/resource-files/population-white-paper.pdf
21https://www.facebook.com/overpopulatedsg
22https://sg.news.yahoo.com/fury-over-6-9-million-population-target-for-singapore-103503070.html
23http://www.mom.gov.sg/foreign-manpower/foreign-worker-levies/Pages/levies-quotas-for-hiring-foreign-workers.
aspx
24https://sg.news.yahoo.com/singapore-s-population-hits-5-47-million--grows-its-slowest-in-10-years-100102584.
html
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fluences socioeconomic outcomes. With its multiracial heritage, Singapore’s institutions have
evolved to promote inclusivity and interracial cooperation, and Singaporeans are accustomed to
living amidst racial diversity. These features suggest that Singapore would be better placed to
manage racial diversification, relative to many other countries, so our estimates of the e↵ect of
racial diversification on socioeconomic outcomes would likely be an underestimate.
1.3.2 Living in Singapore
The nature of Singapores planned communities and its high urban density imply that the e↵ect of
racial diversification would be keenly felt by most of its residents. Singapore is one of the most
densely populated urban cities in the world, with a population density of 7,540 persons per square
kilometer; about 5.4 million people live and work within a land area approximately 3.5 times
the size of Washington, DC.25 The Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) divides Singapore
into 5 geographic regions: North, South, East, West, and Central. Each region comprises several
planning areas; there are 55 planning areas in total. Each planning area can in turn be subdivided
into numerous subzones. Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 below illustrates these concepts — for example,
Elias Park is a subzone in the Pasir Ris planning area, which is located in the Eastern region of
Singapore.
Planning areas are designed to function as self-contained, satellite communities that comprise
public housing units, shopping malls, a town center, and communal facilities. For example, the typ-
ical planning area contains a community center, public parks, schools, places of worship, restau-
rants, supermarkets, retail outlets, pet stores, and movie theatres. Each subzone also has its own lo-
cal grocery stores, kindergartens, outpatient clinics, elderly care facilities, playgrounds, and green
spaces. The upshot is that most Singaporeans can go about their daily lives within the confines of
25https://sg.news.yahoo.com/singapore-s-population-hits-5-47-million--grows-its-slowest-in-10-years-100102584.
html
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Figure 1.1: Planned Communities: East Region
Figure 1.2: Planned Communities: Pasir Ris Planning Area
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Figure 1.3: Planned Communities: Elias Park Subzone
their planning area of residence, traveling to the city center or other parts of the island to work or
play. Consequently, they will not only be highly attuned to a sudden influx of racial out-groups in
their planning area, but also be compelled by geospatial proximity to interact with them. These fea-
tures closely mirror the scope conditions outlined by our theory in Section 2 — awareness about
demographic changes increases the salience of racial identities, deepening the perceived divide
across racial groups.
1.4 Data and Identification Strategy
This section motivates the research design, which seeks to evaluate whether rapid racial diver-
sification between 2000 and 2010 subsequently reduced social cohesion and civic engagement in
Singapore, which we measure using data on self-reported volunteering behavior. Ideally, we would
have designed an experiment that randomly introduced varying rates of racial diversification into
residential neighborhoods and compared socioeconomic outcomes thereafter. However, given the
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infeasibility of such a design in the real world, we opted for an observational study that combined
survey data on volunteering behavior with census data on racial demographic changes. We be-
gin with an overview of the data and define the key variables of interest. We then discuss the
issue of non-random selection into residential neighborhoods and outline our empirical strategy
for estimating the e↵ect of racial diversification on volunteering behavior.
1.4.1 Overview of Data
We construct a novel dataset that combines individual-level survey data from the 2012 Individual
Giving Survey (IGS) — a nationally representative survey on volunteering and giving behavior —
with planning area-level census data on racial demographics from 2000 and 2010.26 We consider
the planning area as the relevant residential neighborhood for each respondent, for the reasons
described in Section 3.2 above. The dataset contains 1,512 observations and includes a range of
control variables that might influence volunteering, which we group into three broad categories:
(1) Individual characteristics; (2) Attitudes toward giving; and (3) Contextual environment charac-
teristics.27 Table 1.1 below summarizes.
Volunteering refers to activities undertaken freely to help others outside ones household, fam-
ily, or relatives, without any expectation of financial compensation (NVPC 2012). We further
distinguish between two forms of volunteering: formal and informal. Formal volunteering refers
to volunteering activity that occurs through participation in an organization, whereas informal vol-
unteering refers to volunteering activity that occurs individually outside an organizational context,
such as helping ones neighbors. We construct three binary dependent variables to indicate the type
of volunteer activity that the respondent undertook in 2012: volunteering, formal volunteering, and
26We thank the National Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre (NVPC) for providing us access to their IGS 2012
survey data. For more information on the IGS 2012 survey, see http://www.nvpc.org.sg.
27See Wilson (2000), Wilson and Musick (1997) and Wilson (2012) for excellent overviews on why people volun-
teer.
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Table 1.1: Summary of Variables from the Dataset
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informal volunteering. Overall, 501 of the 1,512 respondents, or about 33 percent, volunteered in
2012. Of these 501 volunteers, 230 (46 percent) volunteered formally through organizations and
271 (54 percent) volunteered informally.
The key explanatory variable is racial diversification, which we define as the percentage change
in the proportion of racial out-groups within a planning area, between 2000 and 2010. The Sin-
gapore census data categorizes four racial groups — Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Others — so
each planning area contains four racial diversification scores to measure the di↵erent localized
experiences for each racial group. Note that our definition of racial diversification implies that
two individuals of di↵erent races who live in the same neighborhood will perceive of demographic
changes in their neighborhood di↵erently. For illustration, consider a neighborhood comprised of
75 percent Chinese and 25 percent Indian residents in the year 2000. Immigration alters the racial
composition of this neighborhood, such that the racial demographics in 2010 are now 70 percent
Chinese and 30 percent Indian. The Chinese resident experiences an increase in the proportion
of Indians in his neighborhood between 2000 and 2010; his racial diversification score is 20 per-
cent.28 By contrast, the Indian resident experiences a decrease in the proportion of Chinese in his
neighborhood between 2000 and 2010; his racial diversification score is negative 6.7 percent. This
accords with our theory of racial diversification outlined in Section 2, where we argued that racial
diversification increases the salience of racial identities and deepens the perceived divide across
racial groups. Racial diversification ranged from -7.6 percent to 71.7 percent, with a mean of 8.6
percent and a standard deviation of 8.8 percent. Overall, neighborhoods were diversifying rapidly,
with the average person experiencing a greater influx of racial out-groups in a span of 10 years.
28Racial diversification from the Chinese residents perspective is 100 X (Proportion of Indians in 2010 Proportion
of Indians in 2000)/ Proportion of Indians in 2000.
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1.4.2 Nonrandom Selection into Residential Neighborhoods
Next, we address potential concerns about self-selection into residential neighborhoods, which
could yield biased estimates of the e↵ect of racial diversification on volunteering behavior. Though
people choose which neighborhood to live in, they generally have less choice in selecting the
broader contextual environment that their neighborhood is situated in, in part because of employ-
ment or family reasons (Dustmann and Preston 2001). We suggest that this is indeed the case
for Singapore, where the unique combination of a computerized balloting process for new public
housing units and ethnic quotas for public housing apartment blocks and neighborhoods result in a
greater degree of self-selection into subzones relative to planning areas. Note that planning areas
include a mix of public housing, private apartments, and landed houses. Since the vast majority of
Singaporeans live in government-built apartment buildings, we focus on self-selection into public
housing estates, since the resulting racial composition in those locations will approximately reflect
the overall racial composition in the aggregated planning areas.
We argue that racial diversification at the planning area level can serve as an exogenous instru-
ment for racial diversification at the subzone level (Dustmann and Preston 2001) —- the measures
are highly correlated because planning area racial diversification is an aggregate of subzone racial
diversification; moreover, self-selection occurs at the subzone level rather than the planning area.
We begin with an overview of public housing in Singapore and how they relate to the URA’s
planned communities outlined in Section 3.2. Next, we explain how ethnic quotas a↵ect racial
demographics within residential neighborhoods. We then describe the process of balloting for a
new flat from the HDB and how that reinforces self-selection into subzones rather than planning
areas.
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Approximately 82 percent of Singaporeans live in public housing — multi-story apartment
blocks built by the governments Housing Development Board (HDB).29 Each HDB block com-
prises an average of 74 households; 45 HDB blocks make up an average HDB neighborhood and
several clusters of HDB neighborhoods make up a HDB town (Wong 2013).30 Figure 1.4 below
illustrates these concepts. The map presents two partial HDB neighborhoods within the HDB’s
Tampines New Town. HDB blocks are colored red and communal facilities are colored grey. In
general, Neighborhood X comprises all HDB blocks numbered from “X”00 to “X”99, where X is
between 1 to 9. In Fig 1.4, Neighborhood 1 comprises all HDB blocks numbered from 100 to 199,
whereas neighborhood 2 comprises all HDB blocks numbered from 200 to 299, and so on. Note
that HDB towns are part of a URA planning area, whereas HDB neighborhoods are part of a URA
subzone. We refer to these concepts interchangeably for the rest of the paper.
The Singapore government implemented the Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) in 1989 to ensure
a “balanced ethnic mix across HDB estates and to prevent the formation of racial enclaves”.31 The
EIP sought to promote racial integration by mandating uniform upper limits on the proportion of
racial groups within all HDB blocks and HDB neighborhoods. These quotas reflect Singapore’s
demographic composition but allow for some variation. For example, in 2010, the ethnic quota
for HDB blocks was 25% for Malays, 87% for Chinese, and 15% for Indians and Others, whereas
the ethnic quota for HDB neighborhoods was 22% for Malays, 84% for Chinese, and 12% for
Indians and Others. Comparatively, Singapore comprised 13.4% Malays, 74.1% Chinese, and
12.5% Indians and Others. See Table 1.2 below. Importantly, these quotas applied only to first-time
purchases of new flats from the HDB or the purchase of flats on the resale market that were made
after 1989. Real estate transactions in the public housing market were only allowed to proceed if
29See Board (2013).
30The high population density means that each HDB neighborhood is comparable to a US Census tract by population
size (Wong 2013).
31http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10296p.nsf/PressReleases/C515273FA068DD58482576DD00169155?
OpenDocument.
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Figure 1.4: Geospatial Overview of Tampines New Town
Table 1.2: 2010 Ethnic Quotas in HDB Neighborhoods and Blocks
they did not result in the HDB block or HDB neighborhood exceeding the mandated ethnic quota.
The computerized process for new flats reinforces selection at the level of the HDB block
and neighborhood (URA subzone), and not the HDB town (URA planning area). When first-time
buyers wish to purchase a new HDB flat from the government, they submit a ballot to the HDB.
Their success at the ballot depends on the characteristics of the applicant — for example, first-time
buyers and married couples with children have a higher probability of winning the ballot. Ballot
winners are invited to purchase new flats from among the various HDB blocks that happen to be put
up for sale. The process is as follows. First, ballot winners select a flat type— for example, 2-room,
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3-room, or 4-room — within a particular HDB neighborhood (see Figure 1.5). Next, they select
the HDB block within the neighborhood (see Figure 1.6). Note that the ethnic quotas for HDB
neighborhood and HDB block are displayed at each part of the process. Applicants will not be
allowed to purchase a flat if the quota for their racial group has been met. This process reinforces
conscious selection at the subzone level because people first select into the HDB neighborhood
before selecting their HDB block.
Figure 1.5: Selecting a HDB Neighborhood for First-Time Buyers
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Figure 1.6: Selecting a HDB Block for First-Time Buyers
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Overall, the quotas e↵ectively place an upper bound on the level of racial heterogeneity within
HDB blocks and neighborhoods in the long run. However, racial diversification can still take
place in the short run because of the initial variation in racial heterogeneity across HDB blocks
and neighborhoods prior to 1989 — residential areas that were previously more homogeneous are
becoming more diverse. Immigration increases racial diversification at the planning area level
because the new immigrants self-select into HDB blocks and neighborhoods, albeit subject to a
broad set of ethnic quotas, thereby changing the demographic composition within planning areas.
1.4.3 Empirical Strategy
We seek to evaluate the e↵ect of racial diversification on formal volunteering and informal volun-
teering. For each evaluation, we first present the results from a logistic regression with regional
dummies and standard errors clustered by planning area-racial group. We then include controls
for the respondents individual characteristics and attitudes toward giving. Next, we include con-
trols for the contextual environment. Our preferred model is the most conservative: the logistic
regression with regional dummies, clustered standard errors, and all controls included. To interpret
the racial diversification coe cient from the logistic regressions, we use the CLARIFY software
in STATA (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000). We set the values of all control variables to their
means and examine the change in predicted values of the dependent variable when racial diversifi-
cation increases from 0 to the mean level of racial diversification.
1.5 Findings
In this section, we present the empirical findings. We begin with the findings for the e↵ect of
racial diversification on formal and informal volunteering behavior. Next, we delve into a short
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discussion on the control variables. We then implement several robustness checks: dropping racial
diversification outliers and implementing multilevel logistic regressions to account for the hierar-
chical nature of the sampled data.
1.5.1 Did Racial Diversification Reduce Formal and Informal Volunteering?
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 respectively present the results from the various logistic regressions on formal
and informal volunteering behavior. Overall, racial diversification lowered respondents propen-
sity to engage in informal volunteering but had no e↵ect on their formal volunteering behavior —
racial diversification is negative and statistically significant for the informal volunteering analyses
and negative but statistically insignificant for the formal volunteering analyses. Setting the values
of all control variables to their means, we simulate that a person living in an average neighborhood
that underwent racial diversification was 20.5 percent less likely to engage in informal volunteer-
ing, compared to a person living in a demographically static neighborhood. Interestingly, racial
heterogeneity had no e↵ect formal volunteering or informal volunteering.32 Note that this is in ac-
cordance with our theoretical arguments in Section 2 about how racial diversification, rather than
racial diversity, influences social cohesion and civic engagement.
32Result available upon request.
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Table 1.3: The E↵ect of Racial Diversification on the Likelihood of Formal Volunteering
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, and * at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.4: The E↵ect of Racial Diversification on the Likelihood of Informal Volunteering
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, and * at the 0.10 level.
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1.5.2 The Control Variables
We had included a range of controls that might influence formal and informal volunteering, which
we had grouped into three broad categories: (1) Individual characteristics; (2) Attitudes toward
giving; and (3) Contextual environment characteristics. Table 1.5 below lists these controls and
notes their e↵ect on both formal and informal volunteering.
Those who believed that they needed to “do more to help others or the community” were more
likely to volunteer formally and informally (see the Self-help variable in Table 1.5). This finding
does not surprise, as we would expect people who hold such beliefs to possess more altruistic
preferences and prosocial tendencies.
Individual-level characteristics such as age, employment status, and citizenship status influ-
enced formal volunteering but not informal volunteering. Specifically, older respondents and those
who were employed in either a full-time or a part-time job were less likely to volunteer formally;
citizens were more likely to engage in formal volunteering activities.
The relationship between age and employment status is in line with previous research that
the lack of time explained why people did not volunteer in formal organizations (NVPC 2012).
People generally take on greater personal and work commitments as they grow older, which in
turn reduces the amount of time they have to volunteer (Wilson 2000). For example, those in
their early thirties need to spend time raising their children and developing in their careers and
therefore have less time to volunteer. Similarly, people who are employed have less time to engage
in volunteering activities. Time constraints are more binding when applied to formal rather than
informal volunteer, as the former requires greater and more sustained time commitment than the
latter. This explains why age predicts formal volunteering but not informal volunteering activity.
The finding that citizens are more likely to engage in formal volunteering behavior accords
with research on social capital and social ties. Citizens generally have stronger ties to their local
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Table 1.5: Comparison of the Predictors of Formal and Informal Volunteering
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community relative to non-citizens. Formal volunteering encompasses a range of activities that
include voluntary provision of public goods, whereas informal volunteering is limited solely to the
provision of personal help to another person. We therefore expect citizens to be more likely than
non-citizens to volunteer formally.
By contrast, gender, race, marital status, previous history of donating, population growth of
the local community, and housing type explained informal volunteering behavior but not formal
behavior. Specifically, men and those from the “Other” racial group were less likely to volunteer
informally; those who were married, donated in the past 12 months, resided in planning areas
that were experiencing high population growth rates between 2000 and 2010, and lived in densely
populated housing types such as HDB blocks were more likely to volunteer informally.
The findings on gender, racial group, and previous donating behavior have precedent in pre-
vious research. Women are more likely than men to volunteer informally because they have been
socialized to be more nurturing. Informal volunteering encompasses activities that fit into a female
gender role (Gallagher 1994), whereas formal volunteering spans a wide variety of activities, not
all of which fit into clearly defined gender roles (Wilson 2000). Unobserved cultural attributes that
are specific to particular racial groups could also influence patterns of volunteering behavior. For
example, blacks are more likely to volunteer informally because they lack the resources to engage
in formal volunteering work (Gallagher 1994). The findings suggest that members of the “Other”
racial group are less likely to volunteer informally, but do not explain why. Finally, those who
donated in the past 12 months are likely to be more prosocial in general and therefore more likely
to engage in informal volunteering, which is more purely about helping others compared to for-
mal volunteering — people volunteer formally for numerous reasons that might be independent of
helping others, such as acquiring a new skill, improving their resume, or strengthening their social
network; people who volunteer informally generally do so to help people.
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Finally, the findings on population growth and housing type relate to the contextual environ-
ment that respondents live in, particularly the population density of the surrounding area. In gen-
eral, the higher the population density, the more interactions people will have with others on a daily
basis, and therefore the more opportunities for informal volunteering. It therefore makes sense that
those who live in planning areas that experienced high population growth were more likely to vol-
unteer informally. Similarly, we would also expect those who live in high-density HDB blocks to
engage in informal volunteering more frequently than those who live in landed houses (the omitted
group).
1.5.3 Robustness Checks
Next, we evaluate whether our findings are robust to the exclusion of outliers and multilevel logistic
regression models that account for the hierarchical nature of the sampling method used to generate
the data.
First, most people in Singapore experienced moderate levels of racial diversification between
2000 and 2010 — the mean racial diversification was 8.1 percent, with a standard deviation of
8.6 percent. However, the distribution of racial diversification suggests that some racial groups
experienced extreme levels of racial diversification — for example, Chinese living in the Tanglin
planning area experienced a 72 percent increase in the proportion of other racial groups.
To evaluate whether the inclusion of these outliers influenced the results from the earlier anal-
yses, we trim the outliers from our data and rerun our analyses on the trimmed sample. For the
purposes of this robustness check, we implement the most conservative logistic regression model
with all control variables included (see Tables 1.4 and 1.5, column 4). Table 1.6 below summarizes
the results from these analyses. Columns 1 and 2 present the results when we trim the top and
bottom 5 percent of the sample; columns 3 and 4 present the results when we trim the top and
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bottom 10 percent of the sample. Overall, our findings are robust to the exclusion of outliers —
racial diversification lowered the propensity to engage in informal volunteering behavior but did
not influence the formal volunteering behavior.
Second, our data has a hierarchical structure, since it comprises observations that were obtained
through a two-stage sampling process — households were randomly sampled from planning areas
and people were randomly sampled from households. Moreover, our analyses involve examining
how contextual variables at the planning area level (racial diversification) influenced decisions to
volunteer at the individuals level. Traditional logistic regressions do not account for these hierar-
chical relationships and instead treat each observation in our dataset as independent; they lead to
underestimates in the standard errors for the regression coe cients, thereby increasing the likeli-
hood of identifying significant e↵ects when none exist (Gelman 2006; Gelman and Hill 2007; Hox
2010).33 Multilevel models account for the hierarchies in the data by allowing for residual compo-
nents at each level in the hierarchy. For our data, this means partitioning the residual variance of
the logistic regression model into a between component (variance of the racial groupplanning area
residuals) and a within component (variance of the household level residuals).
Table 1.7 below presents the results from a two-level random intercepts logistic regression, with
levels fixed at the racial groupplanning area level and the household level.34 Column 1 presents
the results with formal volunteering as the dependent variable and Column 2 presents the results
with informal volunteering as the dependent variable. We obtain the same findings as our initial
analyses in Section 1.5.1 — racial diversification lowered the propensity to engage in informal
volunteering.
33The University of Bristols Centre for Multilevel Modelling provides an excellent online resource for multilevel
models. See http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmm/learning/multilevel-models/what-why.html.
34See Laurence (2011) for an example of research that use multilevel modeling.
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Table 1.6: Robustness Check: Excluding Outliers from the Analyses
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, and * at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.7: Robustness Check: Robustness Check: Multilevel Logistic Regressions
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, and * at the 0.10 level.
34
Chapter 1. Demographic Changes, Social Cohesion and Civic Engagement: The E↵ect of Racial
Diversification on Volunteering Behavior
1.6 Conclusion
Overall, we find that racial diversification reduced the likelihood of informal volunteering but not
formal volunteering; racial heterogeneity had no e↵ect on volunteering behavior. How should we
interpret these findings?
Though we do not directly test for the mechanisms through which racial diversification lowers
the likelihood of informal but not formal volunteering, we speculate that interpersonal trust plays
a significant role, in line with previous research that finds that racially heterogeneous communi-
ties have lower levels of trust (Glaeser et al. 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Anderson and Paskevi-
ciute 2006; Putnam 2007). Informal volunteering generally involves spontaneous helping of others
within ones immediate environment; it is intensely personal and targeted in nature, requiring a high
degree of direct interaction between the volunteer and recipient. By contrast, formal volunteering
encompasses planned activities that include interpersonal giving (e.g., reading to underprivileged
children), promoting a cause (e.g., raising awareness on environmental protection), and contribut-
ing to the public good (e.g., cleaning litter in ones neighborhood). It is less personal and more
di↵use than informal volunteering as volunteers need not interact directly with recipients.
When neighborhoods diversify, racial identities become more salient, sharpening the perceived
divide across racial groups. Intergroup contact sparks fears of intergroup competition and lowers
interpersonal trust, which in turn reduces the natural a nity that neighbors have for one another.
People volunteer informally primarily because they feel a sense of a nity with the recipient and
are compelled by circumstance to help; the diminished interpersonal trust that comes with racial
diversification therefore lowers the likelihood of informal volunteering because it removes a core
source of motivation for doing so. Formal volunteering remains una↵ected by neighborhood racial
diversification because people engage in such activities for a variety of reasons that extend beyond
interpersonal helping, such as enhancing their resume and making new friends.
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In conclusion, our study extends the main findings from Alesina and Ferrara (2000), Costa
and Kahn (2003), and Putnam (2007), using a new set of data on volunteering behavior in a non-
Western context. We find that racial heterogeneity reduces social cohesion and civic engagement,
but only in communities that are undergoing rapid demographic change. Because we focus on res-
idents living in Singapore, a country with a rich tradition of multiculturalism and immigration, the
e↵ect of racial diversification might be even greater in countries with weaker institutions for pro-
moting inclusivity and interracial cooperation. The negligible e↵ect that racial diversification had
on formal volunteering, however, gives some cause for hope. People engage in formal volunteering
for various reasons, so it remains possible that bonding social capital forged from prior social inter-
actions that were facilitated by volunteer work could help communities withstand the deleterious
e↵ects of racial diversification. This appears to be the case for Singapore, where racial diversifica-
tion had no e↵ect on formal volunteering activities that revolved somewhat around shared identities
and social causes — rather than direct interpersonal helping la informal volunteering — such as
sitting on professional boards, campaigning for the environment, and preserving heritage. Indeed,
recent research demonstrates that shared identities and common understandings that emerge from
repeated intergroup contact could serve as rallying points for inter-ethnic cooperation (Charnysh,
Lucas and Singh 2015). Racial heterogeneity does not condemn communities to perpetual conflict;
policymakers should therefore focus their e↵orts on integrating immigrants, rather than excluding
them.
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Chapter 2
Micro-Targeting Appeals to Encourage
Prosocial Behavior:
Evidence from a Field Experiment on
Volunteering
Can micro-targeted appeals — messages that are tailored to match the characteristics of subgroups
within a target population — improve the e↵ectiveness of volunteer outreach campaigns in recruit-
ing volunteers? We used data from a field experiment in Singapore to examine which combination
of contextual information and motivational frames increased actual volunteering behavior among
current volunteers, former volunteers, and non-volunteers. Contextual information refers to back-
ground information about childhood poverty in Singapore. Motivational frames refer to messages
that emphasize the altruistic, impure altruistic, self-image, and self-interest aspects of volunteer-
ing. Overall, current volunteers and former volunteers were 33 percent more likely to express
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interest in volunteering, compared to non-volunteers. However, among those interested in vol-
unteering, volunteer status had no e↵ect on whether they actually volunteered. We also find that
information about childhood poverty had no e↵ect on volunteering behavior. By contrast, the e↵ect
of motivational frames varied across the subgroups. The mere opportunity to volunteer appeared
su cient to nudge current volunteers to volunteer — motivational frames had no e↵ect on their
actual volunteering behavior. Impure altruism motivational frames were most e↵ective in nudging
former volunteers to volunteer again, whereas altruism motivational frames were most e↵ective in
nudging non-volunteers to begin volunteering for the first time.
2.1 Introduction
Every year, nonprofits and social welfare organizations depend on the generosity of millions of
unpaid volunteers to implement their programs and e↵ect social change. Volunteers contribute their
time toward numerous causes, such as collecting and distributing food to the homeless and poor,
raising awareness on environmental and gender equality issues, tutoring underprivileged children,
and providing companionship to the elderly. Overall, volunteers generate significant economic
and social value for their communities; 64.5 million volunteers in the United States contributed an
estimated $175 billion worth of services in 2012.1
To remain viable, voluntary organizations need to continuously nurture and expand their vol-
unteer base. They do so through volunteer outreach campaigns, which encompass both passive ad-
vertising on broadcast and print media and direct engagement with the public through face-to-face
appeals. Besides providing information on pressing social issues and volunteering opportunities,
the ultimate aim of such e↵orts is to encourage people to volunteer. The specific content of ap-
peals and the media through which they are delivered may influence their e↵ectiveness in shaping
1See http://www.volunteeringinamerica.gov/national for more information.
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behaviors in the desired fashion. Yet little rigorous research has been undertaken to directly assess
the e cacy of volunteer outreach campaigns, or to examine how they could be optimally designed.
Academics have generally focused on understanding non-pecuniary motivations for prosocial be-
havior (Benabou and Tirole 2003) and whether and how financial incentives crowd-out or crowd-in
these intrinsic and image-based motivations (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Frey and Jegen 2002;
Benabou and Tirole 2006; Mellstrom and Johannesson 2008). People are motivated to volunteer
for many di↵erent reasons, so simply knowing that some people respond more positively than
others to non-pecuniary incentives does not provide much actionable insight to voluntary organi-
zations seeking to expand their volunteer base.2 For example, how should voluntary organizations
design their messages to resonate with a varied and diverse pool of potential volunteers? What
types of messages would best appeal to di↵erent subgroups of individuals?
Our study uses data from a field experiment in Singapore to explore whether micro-targeted
appeals — messages that are tailored to match the characteristics of subgroups within a target
population — can improve the e↵ectiveness of volunteer outreach campaigns in recruiting vol-
unteers. Specifically, we examine which combination of contextual information and motivational
frames increased actual volunteering behavior among three subgroups of individuals: current vol-
unteers, former volunteers, and non-volunteers. Current volunteers were people who had, in the
past twelve months, undertaken activities to help others outside their household, family, or rel-
atives, without any expectation of financial compensation (NVPC 2012). Former volunteers had
volunteered previously but not in the past twelve months and non-volunteers had never volunteered
before. Contextual information refers to background information that seeks to raise awareness on
2John A. List and his co-authors have conducted extensive research on charitable giving to understand why people
give and how to get them to give more. Their work has focused on the use of matching grants, seed money, and
challenge gifts to increase the overall amount of donations. Though their work adds to our understanding on why
people donate and provides insights for charity organizations, their findings are less applicable to volunteering, which
is a very di↵erent type of prosocial activity compared to donating. For example, there is no equivalent to matching
grants and seed money in volunteering. See (List and Lucking-Reiley 2002; Karlan and List 2007; Rondeau and List
2008; Karlan, List and Shafir 2011).
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the importance of a cause, which in our experiment was information about childhood poverty in
Singapore. Motivational frames refer to messages that emphasize the beneficial salience of vol-
unteering, with the aim of targeting the underlying motivations that people have for volunteering.
We focus on four motivational aspects of volunteering, namely pure altruism, impure altruism,
self-image, and self-interest. The field experiment was embedded into the 2014 Individual Giving
Survey (IGS), a comprehensive face-to-face interview on volunteering and giving behavior con-
ducted by the National Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre (NVPC) between July and August of
2014. At the end of the survey interview, all respondents were informed of an opportunity to vol-
unteer to help poor children in Singapore through a show of emotional support. Specifically, they
were shown a blank postcard by the interviewer and told that they could write or draw a personal
message of encouragement to underprivileged children, which they could then mail back to NVPC
to give to the children.
In the experiment, all respondents were assigned to either a study group or a control group.
The control group received only an outright appeal to volunteer, with no contextual information
and no motivational frame provided. Respondents in the study group received one of eight com-
binations of contextual information and motivational frames (e.g., no information on poverty +
altruism frame; information on poverty + altruism frame), followed by an appeal to volunteer.
All respondents who indicated their interest to volunteer were given the blank postcard, asked to
take some time to think about a message to convey to the children, and told to mail the completed
postcard to NVPC within a month from the interview date. Respondents were then prompted by
the interviewer to make a plan to return their postcards to NVPC — they were asked to specify
when they intended to mail in the postcard.3 NVPC tracked their subsequent submission of the
completed postcard.
The findings demonstrate that current volunteers and former volunteers were 33 percent more
3 See (Milkman et al. 2011, 2012; Mao 2014) for examples of research that use planning prompts.
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likely to express interest in volunteering to help poor children, compared to non-volunteers. How-
ever, among those interested in volunteering, volunteer status had no e↵ect on whether they ac-
tually volunteered. Interestingly, information about poverty had no e↵ect on actual volunteering
behavior across all subgroups of respondents. We suspect that the preliminary information about
poor children conveyed su cient information about the nature and meaningfulness of the pro-
posed volunteering activity, such that additional background information about childhood poverty
was deemed superfluous to individual decisions to volunteer. By contrast, the e↵ect of motivational
frames varied across the volunteer-type subgroups. The mere opportunity to volunteer appeared
su cient to nudge current volunteers to volunteer — motivational frames had no e↵ect on their
actual volunteering behavior. Impure altruism frames were most e↵ective in nudging former vol-
unteers to start volunteering again, whereas pure altruism motivational frames were most e↵ective
in nudging non-volunteers to begin volunteering for their first time. Specifically, former volunteers
who received an impure altruism frame were 42 percent more likely to volunteer, compared to
former volunteers who did not receive any motivational frame. Non-volunteers who received an
impure altruism frame were 33 percent more likely to volunteer, compared to non-volunteers who
did not receive any motivational frame.
Overall, we build on the work of Clary et al. (1994), Clary et al. (1998), Clary and Snyder
(1999) and Al-Ubaydli and Lee (2011), who argued that tailoring messages to target peoples un-
derlying motivations for volunteering could prompt them to volunteer. Specifically, we extend
the framework and analyses on micro-targeted messaging, moving beyond current volunteers to
include also both former volunteers and non-volunteers. Together, the three subgroups of current
volunteers, former volunteers, and non-volunteers comprise a mutually exclusive and exhaustive
set of the universe of potential volunteers. The analyses demonstrate that the e cacy of motiva-
tional frames in “nudging” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) people to actually volunteer varies across
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the aforementioned subgroups, in accordance with our theoretical predictions on the potential im-
pact of micro-targeted messaging. Further, the evidence of heterogeneous treatment e↵ects on
volunteering behavior add a layer of nuance to theories about volunteering and prosocial behavior;
they suggest that actual volunteering behavior is the result of interactions between innate propen-
sities to volunteer and situational factors. For example, non-volunteers might have a lower predis-
position for volunteering compared to current volunteers, but they can still be nudged to volunteer
if exposed to the appropriate type of messaging.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theory on micro-targeted
appeals to encourage prosocial behavior. Section 3 describes the experimental design and timeline.
Section 4 presents the data and Section 5 outlines the evaluation strategy. Section 6 presents the
findings. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Theory: DesigningMicro-TargetedMessages to Get People
to Volunteer
In this era of big data, politicians increasingly rely on data crunching to target voters — they first
identify salient voter characteristics that predict voting behavior and then craft tailored messages
for voters based on those characteristics (Hersh and Scha↵ner 2013). For example, the Obama cam-
paign is widely acknowledged to have leveraged campaign analytics to improve and fine-tune their
campaign strategy to improve voter turnout and donations (Pack 2010).4 Indeed, advertisers and
campaign managers are transitioning from blunt, broad-based appeals to incisive, micro-targeted
appeals designed to optimize the e↵ect of their messages in changing behaviors (Hillygus and
Shields 2008). This shift toward customized messaging has been driven by the increased access to
4See also http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/23/magazine/the-obama-campaigns-digital-masterminds-cash-in.
html?pagewanted=all& r=0
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large amounts of personal data (to understand the message recipient), the availability of targeted
media platforms such as mobile applications on smartphones (to direct the targeted messages), and
advances in experimental methodology (to evaluate which strategies work best among subgroups
of the population). Overall, the basic argument is that people respond di↵erently to di↵erent mes-
sages for reasons that are correlated with their individual characteristics, so customizing messages
to match their individual profiles could increase the e cacy of public engagement campaigns in
changing peoples’ behaviors.
We had proposed to the NVPC that micro-targeted messaging could increase the e↵ectiveness
of volunteer outreach campaigns in recruiting volunteers. In an ideal situation, NVPC would have
access to a volunteering database that contained information about all residents in Singapore that
might predict volunteering, such as their demographic characteristics, personality profiles, and ge-
ographic area of residence. The database would also include information on whether each individ-
ual was a current volunteer, former volunteer, or non-volunteer. From this database, NVPC would
build a predictive model to identify naturally occurring clusters of individuals and their propen-
sities to volunteer. They would then micro-target these individuals and implement randomized
controlled trials that stratified on these pre-defined clusters in order to determine which message
types would work best for each salient sub-group.
However, NVPC neither maintained nor had access to such a database. We therefore suggested
that NVPC focus on three subgroups of individuals that would ex-ante matter from the perspective
of a voluntary organization. The three salient subgroups were current volunteers, former volun-
teers, and non-volunteers. Of course, people make their behavioral choices based on di↵erent rea-
sons. We therefore expected to encounter, across the subgroups, individuals who were motivated
to volunteer for di↵erent reasons, individuals who gave up volunteering for di↵erent reasons, and
individuals who have never volunteered for di↵erent reasons. Even so, what mattered more for
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our theory was that individuals within a subgroup were more alike to each other than individuals
across subgroups, and that there existed a set of observed and latent characteristics across the sub-
groups that moderates the e↵ectiveness of di↵erent messages on members of each subgroup. In
other words, we argued that volunteer status is a salient characteristic of the individual that would
determine the e cacy of micro-targeted messages.
The NVPC built on the above insights and proposed examining two characteristics of volunteer
appeals — contextual information and motivational frames — within a field experiment embed-
ded in the IGS 2014 survey. Contextual information refers to background information that seeks
to raise awareness on the importance of a cause, whereas motivational frames refer to messages
that emphasize the beneficial salience of volunteering, with the aim of targeting the underlying
motivations that people have for volunteering. Because NVPC did not know ex-ante the volunteer
status for each respondent, they had to randomly assign the contextual information and motiva-
tional frame treatments across the entire sample of respondents, rather than within strata of current
volunteers, former volunteers, and non-volunteers. We return to this discussion in the next sec-
tion. At the end of the IGS 2014 survey interview, NVPC would inform all respondents of an
opportunity to volunteer to help poor children in Singapore through a show of emotional support.
Respondents would be shown a blank postcard and told that the volunteering opportunity would
involve writing or drawing a personal message of encouragement to underprivileged children, and
then mailing the completed postcard to NVPC to give to the children (see Figure 2.1 below for an
example of a blank postcard). The NVPC would then administer the field experiment to examine
which combinations of contextual information and motivational frames would be most e↵ective in
nudging respondents to volunteer to help the poor children.
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Figure 2.1: Blank Postcard Given to Respondents Who Were Interested to Volunteer
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For the purposes of the experiment, the relevant contextual information was background infor-
mation on childhood poverty in Singapore and how children growing up in low incomes families
experienced more stress and lacked adequate resources to succeed in school.5 NVPC believed
that providing respondents with this information would raise their awareness of childhood poverty
as an important social issue in Singapore and in turn increase their likelihood of volunteering.
Awareness about social issues is a strong predictor of volunteering (Wilson 2000). We therefore
hypothesize that contextual information would influence actual volunteering as follows:
(1) Respondents who received background information on poverty would be more
likely to volunteer to help poor children, relative to those who do not receive any
background information on poverty.
There exist three broad motivations for pro-social behavior: intrinsic, extrinsic, and image
motivation. Intrinsic motivation is the value of giving per se, represented by private preferences
for others’ well-being. Extrinsic motivation is associated with a material private reward or benefit,
either monetary or non-monetary, that is obtained as part of the giving process, such as thank-you
gestures, tax breaks, and career and social-networking opportunities. Image motivation refers to
individuals’ concern for how others perceive them and their own self-perception — the desire to
be liked and respected by others and one’s self-esteem. Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1 below summarize
this framework. Note that previous research has generally examined why people volunteer, but not
why they stopped volunteering or have never volunteered. We argue that the various motivations
for volunteering are universal in nature, so they would also apply to former volunteers and non-
volunteers, though perhaps to a smaller extent. For example, former volunteers and non-volunteers
5The exact wording was: “To give you a brief background, childhood poverty is an important issue in Singapore.
Today, about 10 percent of households earn less than S$1,250 a month. This is the average amount needed by a
four-person household to meet basic needs such as clothing, food, shelter, and other essentials. Children from these
households are severely disadvantaged growing up as they experience more stress and lack adequate resources to
succeed in school. Volunteer organizations are trying to address this issue and are seeking volunteers to help poor
children.”
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might be intrinsically motivated to help others, but are constrained from doing so because of a lack
of time.
Figure 2.2: Motivations for Volunteering
Ideally, NVPC would have designed and tested messages that matched all the motivations out-
lined in Figure 2.2. However, concerns about sample size and lack of statistical power compelled
NVPC to limit the number of motivational frames that they could include in the field experiment.
NVPC eventually decided to target four well-known motivations for prosocial behavior: pure al-
truism, impure altruism, self-image, and self-interest.
In the experiment, these motivational frames were administered immediately after the con-
textual information treatments. The survey interviewers began with a rhetorical question, asking
respondents: “why should you volunteer?”. They then read out messages designed to prime re-
spondents to think about the various motivational aspects of volunteering, by sharing how volun-
teers would respond to the previous question. For example, the pure altruism motivational frame
targeted individuals who genuinely care about the welfare of others (Becker 1974; Piliavin and
Charng 1990; Unger 1991; Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund 2007); recipients of this frame
were told that many volunteers believed that volunteering allowed them to make a real di↵erence
in the lives of the poor children. By contrast, the impure altruism motivational frame targeted in-
dividuals who derived a warm glow satisfaction from the act of helping, without concern for the
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Table 2.1: Description of Motivations for Pro-social Behavior
welfare of others (Andreoni 1989, 1990); recipients of this frame were told that many volunteers
believed that volunteering provided them with a strong feeling of satisfaction and pride. The self-
image motivational frame targeted individuals who possessed a strong desire to conform to their
internal images of themselves society (Benabou and Tirole 2003; Ariely, Bracha and Meier 2009).
In this case, the NVPC focused on the image of being a contributing member of society; recipients
of the self-image frame were told that many volunteers believed that volunteering was an impor-
tant part of being a good citizen. The self-interest motivational frame targeted individuals who
sought out personal benefits from volunteering, such as enhancing their resume or expanding their
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social networks (Clary et al. 1998). Recipients of this frame were told that many volunteers be-
lieved that volunteering provided them with valuable new skills and experiences. Table 2.2 below
summarizes. See Appendix A-1 for more information.
Table 2.2: Summary of Motivational Frame Treatments
What types of motivational frames would best appeal to current volunteers, former volunteers,
and non-volunteers? Previous research suggests that tailoring messages to match volunteers’ un-
derlying motivations for volunteering could improve their overall satisfaction with volunteering
work (Clary, Snyder and Ridge 1992; Clary et al. 1994, 1998) and encourage them to volunteer
more (Al-Ubaydli and Lee 2011).6 The upshot is that messages are most e↵ective when they are
micro-targeted — altruistic volunteers would respond most positively to messages that empha-
size how others benefit from their work, whereas career-oriented volunteers would respond most
positively to messages that emphasize how volunteering helped them pick up new skills. Note,
however, that none of the above research directly examined how messages could be designed to en-
tice former volunteers and non-volunteers to begin volunteering. Hence the purpose of the NVPC
study, which sought to uncover the types of messaging that would be most e↵ective in nudging
current volunteers, former volunteers, and non-volunteers to volunteer.
Overall, we hypothesized that the motivational frame treatments would have the following
e↵ects on volunteering behavior:
6See Wilson (2000, 2012) for excellent overviews on why people volunteer.
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(2) Current volunteers and former volunteers would be more likely to volunteer, com-
pared to non-volunteers. This accords with the findings that past history of volunteer-
ing predicts current volunteering (Wilson 2000).
(3) Current volunteers who received a motivational frame would be no more likely
to volunteer, relative to current volunteers who did not receive a motivational frame.
We suggest that this is because volunteers are generally more likely to volunteer when
asked, irrespective of the message frame.
(4) Former volunteers who received either an impure altruism or self-interest moti-
vational frame would be more likely to volunteer, relative to former volunteers who
did not receive a motivational frame. Many former volunteers stopped volunteering
because they lacked the time to do so or became disillusioned with the volunteering
process. Appeals to impure altruism and self-interest could prompt former volunteers
to take up volunteering again by either reminding them of the warm glow e↵ect they
experienced when they previously volunteered, or providing an incentive to reduce the
costs of volunteering.
(5) Non-volunteers who received a self-interest motivational frame would be more
likely to volunteer, relative to non-volunteers who did not receive a motivational frame.
Many non-volunteers never took the first step to volunteer because they lacked the time
or were less prosocial nature by nature. Appeals to self-interest could prompt non-
volunteers to begin volunteering for the first by reducing the costs of volunteering.
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2.3 Experimental Design
This section motivates the experimental design, which sought to evaluate whether contextual in-
formation and motivational frames could increase actual volunteering behavior among three types
of individuals — current volunteers, former volunteers, and non-volunteers. We first detail the
experimental design and treatments. We then present the experimental timeline.
2.3.1 Experimental Design: Random Assignment to Treatments
The ideal experimental design would comprise a stratified randomization, stratifying on volunteer
status and the URA’s planning area. The NVPC would have data on the respondents’ planning area
of residence and volunteer status, prior to the commencement of the field experiment. They would
use the data to create planning area/volunteer status strata and then randomly assign respondents
within strata to either one of the eight treatment combinations from a 2 X 4 factorial design (Factor
1: Contextual Information — No information on poverty vs. information on poverty; Factor 2:
Motivational Frame — Pure Altruism vs. Self-Image vs. Self-Interest vs. Impure Altruism) or a
control condition.7 Table 2.3 below summarizes.
7See Fisher (1935), Friedman and Sunder (1994), and Box, Hunger and Hunter (1978) for more information on
factorial designs.
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Table 2.3: The 2 X 4 Factorial Design
In practice, the NVPC was unable to implement the ideal experimental design because they
lacked ex-ante information on respondents’ volunteer status prior to the commencement of the
IGS 2014 survey. They therefore adopted a stratified randomization design, stratifying only on the
URA’s planning area.
2.3.2 Experimental Timeline
Table 2.4 below outlines the experimental timeline, which was divided into the pre-survey phase,
during survey phase, and post-survey phase.
The pre-survey phase began in June 2014, a month before the fieldwork for the IGS 2014
commenced. At this stage, NVPC purchased a sampling frame containing a list of 5,000 house-
holds from the Singapore Department of Statistics.8 Households in the sampling frame were then
assigned to one of the eight treatment groups or control group.
The during survey phase took place between August 2014 to September 2014. The NVPC
8The Singapore Department of Statistics (DOS) maintains a National Database on Dwellings (NDD) in Singapore.
This database is updated monthly to provide a comprehensive sampling frame for conducting household surveys.
DOS stratifies according to the Urban Redevelopment Authority’s (URA) planning areas and implements probability
proportional to size sampling within each strata.
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Table 2.4: The Experimental Timeline
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began by conducting a comprehensive face-to-face interview with residents on their volunteering
and giving behavior in the past 12 months. At the end of the survey interview, NVPC informed
the respondents of an opportunity to help poor children in Singapore through emotional support.
Respondents were shown a blank postcard and told that they could write or draw a personal mes-
sage of encouragement on the postcard, which they could then mail back to NVPC to give to the
children. NVPC then administered the contextual information and motivational frame treatments.
Respondents were then asked whether they would be interested to volunteer to help poor children
through emotional support with the postcard. All respondents who indicated their interest to vol-
unteer were given the blank postcard, asked to take some time to think about a message to convey
to the children, and told to mail the completed postcard to NVPC by a month from the interview
date. They were then prompted by the interviewer to make a plan to return the postcard to NVPC
— the interviewers asked them to specify when they intended to mail in the postcard.9
In the post-survey phase, the NVPC tracked respondents’ submission of the postcard for up to
a month after the survey interview. See Figure 2.3 in below for an illustration of the completed
postcards. We assumed that respondents who did not submit the postcard within the one-month
window were unlikely to do so subsequently.
9See Milkman et al. (2011, 2012) and Mao (2014) for examples of research that use planning prompts.
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2.4 The Experimental Data and Evaluation Strategy
This section describes the data from the field experiment and IGS 2014 surveys and our evaluation
strategy. We begin with an overview of the data. We then evaluate whether randomization achieved
balance in observed covariates across the treatment and control groups of interest. Finally, we
discuss the evaluation strategy.
2.4.1 Overview of Data
The fieldwork for the IGS 2014 survey interviews was conducted between July 2014 and Au-
gust 2014. The NVPC interviewed a total of 1,828 respondents living in 30 planning areas. The
outcome of interest is whether the respondent actually volunteered, which we measure using the
binary variable volunteered, which equals one if the respondent completed and mailed the postcard
to NVPC, and 0 otherwise. Approximately 11.1 percent of the respondents were assigned to each
of the nine treatment groups, which suggest that the randomization was properly implemented.10
Table 2.5 below summarizes.
The demographic characteristics of IGS 2014 respondents are generally similar to those of
the national population’s. That said, IGS 2014 respondents are on average older, more educated,
and less likely to be male. For the IGS 2014 sample, 44.4 percent are male and 83.5 percent are
Singaporean citizens; the median age is 45; Chinese comprise 70.7 percent, Malays 13 percent,
Indians 11.4 percent, and other races 4.9 percent; 75.4 percent received a secondary education
or higher, and 94.5 percent of residents live in a 3-room/4-room/5-room flat. By contrast, in the
national population, 49.2 percent are male and 86.2 percent re Singaporean citizens; the median age
is 38.9. Chinese comprise 74.2 percent, Malays 13.3 percent, Indians 9.2 percent, and other races
10The numbers of respondents assigned to each treatment group are not exact because some respondents were not
home when the interviewers visited. SCDF revisited these households a second time, and if they were still not home,
they were excluded from the analysis.
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Table 2.5: Randomization Across Treatment Groups
3.3 percent; 68.8 percent received a secondary education or higher, and 92.9 percent of residents
live in a 3-room/4-room/5-room flat. Table 2.6 below summarizes.
Table 2.6: Comparison of Demographic Profile of IGS 2014 Sample and National Population
2.4.2 Evaluating Covariate Balance Across Treatment and Control Groups
In theory, randomization would ensure that the treatment and control groups were, on average,
similar across both observable and unobservable characteristics. However, there still exists the
possibility that the particular randomizations drawn for the experiment would result in imbalanced
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treatment and control groups. The IGS 2014 contains pre-treatment covariates that would allow
us to check whether randomization achieved balance across the treatment and control groups, and
to use statistical adjustment when estimating the causal e↵ects of interest if balance were not
achieved. Following Mao (2014), we include a range of control variables that might influence
volunteering, which we group into three broad categories: (1) Individual characteristics; (2) Atti-
tudes toward giving; and (3) Contextual environment characteristics. Appendix A-2 summarizes
the data.
The factorial design of our experiment implies that the relevant treatment and control groups
would di↵er when evaluating the e↵ect of contextual information and motivational frames on vol-
unteering behavior. For estimating the causal e↵ect of contextual information, we focus on con-
textual information treatment group (all residents in Treatment Groups 5, 6, 7, and 8) and the no
contextual information treatment group (all residents in Treatment Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4). Note
that we exclude a “pure” test of the information treatment — a treatment condition that contains
information on poverty without a motivation frame. Instead, we evaluate the average e↵ect of
information across all motivation frames. We do so because real-world advocacy involves infor-
mation paired with a particular motivation frame; volunteer organizations rarely engage the public
by providing them only with information. The study therefore provides NVPC with interventions
that could subsequently be scaled up. By contrast, for estimating the causal e↵ect of motivational
frames, we focus on the altruism treatment group (the subset of respondents in Treatment Groups
1 and 5 who were interested to volunteer), the self-image treatment group (the subset of respon-
dents in Treatment Groups 2 and 6 who were interested to volunteer), the self-interest treatment
group (the subset of respondents in Treatment Groups 3 and 7 who were interested to volunteer),
the impure altruism treatment group (the subset of respondents in Treatment Groups 4 and 8 who
were interested to volunteer), and the control group (the subset of respondents in Treatment Group
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9 who were interested to volunteer). Tables 2.7 and 2.8 below summarize.
Table 2.7: Overview of Treatment and Control Groups for Contextual Information
Table 2.8: Overview of Treatment and Control Groups for Motivational Frames
To verify that randomization had successfully achieved balance across the treatment and con-
trol groups, we implement both univariate and multivariate balance diagnostics. The univariate
balance diagnostics comprise a di↵erence-in-means and corresponding two-sample t-test with un-
equal variances, and a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test.11 We consider a covariate
imbalanced if the p-values from both the two-sample t-test and KS test are significant at the 5
percent level. The multivariate balance check comprises a regression of a trichotomous treatment
variable that indicates assignment to one of the five treatment groups (e.g., control group/pure
altruism/self-image/self-interest/impure altruism) on the control covariates. We consider the co-
variates to be imbalanced if they are jointly significant in predicting the trichotomous treatment
variable.
Overall, the balance diagnostics suggest that randomization achieved experimental balance
across all the relevant groupings of interest: (1) Contextual information treatment group vs. No
11See Mao and Vreeland (2012, 2013) for an example on reporting balance diagnostics.
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contextual information control group, (2) Pure altruism treatment group vs. Control group; (3)
Self-Image treatment group vs. Control group; (4) Self-Interest treatment group vs. Control group;
(5) Impure altruism treatment group vs. Control group. See Appendix A-3 for more information.
2.4.3 Evaluation Strategy
We seek to evaluate the e↵ect of contextual information (information on poverty vs. no informa-
tion on poverty) on volunteering behavior, and the e↵ect of motivational frames (pure altruism,
self-image, self-interest, and impure altruism) on volunteering behavior. For each evaluation, we
present logistic regression estimates of the average treatment e↵ects, controlling for pre-treatment
covariates that might predict volunteering behavior and including regional fixed e↵ects with stan-
dard errors clustered at the planning area level. We implement the logistic regression models across
each of the three subgroups of current volunteers, former volunteers, and non-volunteers.
2.5 Experimental Findings
In this section, we present the experimental findings. We first present descriptive statistics of how
volunteering behavior varied across the subgroups of current volunteers, former volunteers, and
non-volunteers. Next, we examine the e↵ect of contextual information on volunteering behavior.
We then examine the e↵ect of motivational frames on volunteering behavior.
2.5.1 Did Volunteering Behavior Vary by Volunteer Status?
Both current volunteers and former volunteers were significantly more likely to express interest to
volunteer to help poor children through emotional support. Specifically, current volunteers were
38 percent more likely to volunteer, compared to non-volunteers (78 percent for current volunteers
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vs. 57 percent for non-volunteers); former volunteers were 24 percent more likely to volunteer,
compared to non-volunteers (70 percent for current volunteers vs. 57 percent for non-volunteers).
Current volunteers were slightly more likely to express interest to volunteer, compared to former
volunteers, though this di↵erence was statistically insignificant.
Interestingly, within the subset of those interested in volunteering, volunteer status had no
significant e↵ect on whether they actually volunteered. We suggest that this is because of the
planning prompt that was administered to the respondents who agreed to volunteer, which helped
reduce the gap between intentions and actions. Volunteer status influenced the likelihood that one
would be interested in a volunteering opportunity, but had no e↵ect on subsequent volunteering
behavior among those who were interested to volunteer.
2.5.2 Did Contextual Information Increase Volunteering Behavior?
Contrary to predictions, information about poverty had no e↵ect on actual volunteering behavior
across all subgroups of respondents. We suggest that the preliminary information about poor chil-
dren conveyed su cient information about the nature and meaningfulness of the proposed volun-
teering activity, such that additional background information about childhood poverty was deemed
superfluous to individual decisions to volunteer.
2.5.3 Did Motivational Frames Increase Volunteering Behavior?
The e↵ect of motivational frames varied across the volunteer-type subgroups. Figure 2.4 below
presents the descriptive statistics of volunteering behavior across the motivational frame treatments
for the subset of current volunteers. A higher proportion of those who received the self-interest
frame volunteered (32 percent), compared to those in the control group (26 percent), though this
di↵erence was not significant. The e↵ects of the pure altruism, self-image, and self-interest al-
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truism motivational frames were also not significantly di↵erent from those of the control group.
Overall, motivational frames had no e↵ect on actual volunteering behavior among current volun-
teers. It would seem that the mere opportunity to volunteer — in this case, writing or drawing a
message of encouragement to poor children on a blank postcard and mailing the completed post-
card to NVPC — was su cient to nudge current volunteers to volunteer.
Figure 2.4: Volunteer Behavior Across Motivational Frames, Among Current Volunteers
Figure 2.5 below presents the descriptive statistics of volunteering behavior across the moti-
vational frame treatments for the subset of former volunteers. A higher proportion of those who
received the impure altruism frame volunteered (37 percent), compared to those in the control
group (8 percent), an increase of 42 percent. The e↵ects of the pure altruism, self-image, and
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self-interest altruism motivational frames were not significantly di↵erent from those of the control
group. Overall, impure altruism frames were most e↵ective in nudging former volunteers to start
volunteering again.
Figure 2.5: Volunteer Behavior Across Motivational Frames, Among Former Volunteers
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Figure 2.6 below presents the descriptive statistics of volunteering behavior across the motiva-
tional frame treatments for the subset of non-volunteers. A higher proportion of those who received
the pure altruism frame volunteered (24 percent), compared to those in the control group (18 per-
cent), an increase of 33 percent. The e↵ects of the impure altruism, self-image, and self-interest
altruism motivational frames were not significantly di↵erent from those of the control group. Over-
all, pure altruism frames were most e↵ective in nudging non-volunteers to begin volunteering for
the first time.
Figure 2.6: Volunteer Behavior Across Motivational Frames, Among Non-Volunteers
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2.6 Conclusion
Overall, we demonstrate that the e cacy of motivational frames varied across the subgroups of
current volunteers, former volunteers, and non-volunteers. Specifically, impure altruism frames
were most e↵ective in nudging former volunteers to volunteer again, whereas pure altruism frames
were most e↵ective in nudging non-volunteers to volunteer for the first time. Note that our exper-
iment focused on residents living in Singapore and examined their decision to volunteer to help
poor children through a show of emotional support, by writing or drawing a personal message of
encouragement on a postcard and then mailing that to NVPC. Though the act of crafting a personal
message on the postcard and mailing it to NVPC represents a costly signal of prosocial behavior,
especially when compared to stated intentions to volunteer in the future, it still di↵ers from most
other types of volunteering that require sustained and costlier commitment. It therefore remains
possible that our specific findings were idiosyncratic to the proposed volunteering activity and
might not generalize to other types of volunteering. That said, we argue that our proposed frame-
work of micro-targeted messaging to appeal to the subgroups of current volunteers, former vol-
unteers, and non-volunteers is generally applicable to volunteer outreach programs across a wide
range of issues, for two reasons: (1) the aforementioned subgroups encompass the universe of
potential volunteers that volunteer organizations would generally seek to recruit; (2) the proposed
modifications to the volunteer appeals are costless and easily implementable, since they require
only the inclusion of a short sentence that emphasizes a motivational aspect of volunteering.
The presence of heterogeneous treatment e↵ects in our analyses suggests that adopting a more
data-driven approach toward volunteer recruitment — in the form of micro-targeted messaging
— could result in significant improvements to the e↵ectiveness of volunteer outreach programs.
As volunteer organizations learn more about their potential pool of volunteers and collect more
data on their preferences and activities, they can leverage the data to build profiles of di↵erent
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subpopulations of individuals and design and test which messages would best appeal to each sub-
population. This would in turn allow them to transition from using blunt, broad-based appeals
to incisive, customized appeals designed to optimize the e↵ect of their messages in encouraging
people to volunteer.
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Leveraging Behavioral Insights to Improve
the E cacy of Public Engagement
Campaigns: Experimental Evidence from
Singapore
Can behavioral modifications to an ongoing public engagement campaign increase its e cacy in
changing behaviors? We used data from a series of randomized experiments to evaluate whether
a combination of contextual frames and follow-through prompts increased attendance at the Com-
munity Emergency Preparedness Program (CEPP), a full-day course that teaches emergency pre-
paredness skills. Contextual frames refer to messages that highlight to residents the beneficial
salience of undertaking a specific action, with the aim of convincing them to change their behav-
ior. Follow-through prompts refer to further engaging residents who have indicated an interest to
change their behavior, with the aim of transforming their intentions into concrete actions. We find
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that contextual frames were significantly more e↵ective in increasing residents’ interest to attend
the CEPP, compared to an outright appeal, but were insu cient in changing behaviors. The follow-
through prompt that leveraged making a plan, commitment and reminder mechanisms, and social
pressure succeeded in increasing CEPP attendance. Our findings suggest that behavioral interven-
tions that simultaneously target multiple psychological and cognitive barriers to behavioral change
could have greater impact on behavior, compared to those that focus only on a single barrier to
behavioral change.
3.1 Introduction
Governments spend hundreds of millions of dollars each year on public engagement campaigns
to promote public safety, raise awareness of important social issues, inform citizens about ma-
jor enhancements to existing government policies, and signal changing priorities in the legislative
agenda.1 Such campaigns generally take the form of passive appeals through mainstream and print
media (e.g. news reports and posters), or active community engagement e↵orts (e.g., town hall
discussions and face-to-face appeals). Besides communicating information, the ultimate aim of
such e↵orts is to engender behavioral change among citizens.2 The specific content of appeals and
the media through which they are delivered may influence their e↵ectiveness in shaping behav-
iors in the desired fashion. Yet little rigorous research has been undertaken to assess the e cacy
of government communications strategies, or to examine how they could be optimally designed.
Academics and practitioners have primarily focused on how public engagement campaigns influ-
ence public opinion (Nan 2008; Stephanson 2003; Shen and Dillard 2007; Stockmann, Esarey and
Zhang 2010), with many implicitly assuming that shifts in attitudes prompt corresponding changes
1According to Kosar (2014), executive branch agencies spent US$892.5 million on advertising contracts in 2013.
2For example, tra c safety campaigns seek to lower the rate of speeding-related tra c accidents by encouraging
motorists to drive safely.
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in behavior (Allport 1935; Azjen and Fishbein 1980; Fazio 1990; Ajzen 1991; Fazio and Towles-
Schwen 1999).3 However, people often behave in ways that seemingly contradict their underlying
attitudes toward an issue (Sheeran 2002; Bartels 2005; Sniehotta, Scholz and Schwarzer 2005).
Public engagement campaigns might succeed in changing behavioral intent and attitudes but have
minimal impact on behavioral outcomes because people fail to act on their intentions. The true
usefulness of public engagement campaigns — whether and how they actually change behaviors
— is therefore unknown.
People often fail to follow-through on their good intentions because they procrastinate, for-
get, or lose interest over time. Much of the recent applied research in behavioral economics and
psychology has focused on designing interventions to bridge the gap between intentions and be-
havior. It collectively seeks to demonstrate how relatively costless interventions that target the
psychological and cognitive barriers to behavioral change can successfully “nudge” (Thaler and
Sunstein 2008) people to behave di↵erently. For example, asking people if they intend to embark
on a course of action (Greenwald et al. 1987; Fitzsimons and Morwitz 1996; Nelson and Norton
2005), pre-committing to a course of action by eliminating future alternatives (Thaler and Shefrin
1981; Schelling 1984, 1992; Wertenbroch 1998), setting goals (Klein 1991; Latham and Locke
1991; Locke and Latham 2002), making concrete plans (Sniehotta, Scholz and Schwarzer 2005;
Rogers et al. 2011; Milkman et al. 2012), publicly committing to a course of action (Burn and
Oskamp 1986), setting deadlines (Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002), and providing reminder prompts
(Milkman et al. 2011, 2012; Vervloet et al. 2012) are but some interventions that have been found
to be e↵ective in changing behaviors across a wide variety of settings.
Our study applied the aforementioned insights from the behavioral economics and psychol-
ogy literatures to the design of public engagement campaigns. We examined whether behavioral
3For an excellent overview of the academic literature on the link between attitudes and behavior, see Azjen and
Fishbein (2005).
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modifications to an ongoing public engagement campaign could increase its e cacy in changing
behaviors. Specifically, we partnered with the Singaporean Ministry of Home A↵airs and Singa-
pore Civil Defense Force (SCDF) to examine how they could modify their post-fire blitz campaign
to increase attendance at the Community Emergency Preparedness Program (CEPP).4 The post-fire
blitz is a community engagement e↵ort that comprises door-to-door household visits by SCDF o -
cers to educate residents about fire safety; the CEPP is a full-day course that teaches basic first aid,
fire safety, and other emergency-related skills. We used data from a series of randomized experi-
ments to evaluate whether a combination of two behavioral modifications to the post-fire blitz —
contextual frames and follow-through prompts — increased CEPP interest and attendance among
residents. Contextual frames refer to messages that highlight to residents the beneficial salience of
undertaking a specific action, with the aim of convincing them to change their behavior. Follow-
through prompts refer to further engaging residents who have indicated an interest to change their
behavior, with the aim of transforming their intentions into concrete actions.
In the experiment, all residents were assigned to either a study group or a control group. The
control group received only an outright appeal to attend the CEPP, with no contextual frame or
follow-up prompt. All residents in the study group first received either one of the following con-
textual frames: a self-interest frame that emphasized how they and their family benefited from
their attending the CEPP, or a communitarian frame that highlighted how their community ben-
efited. They were then asked if they would be interested to attend the CEPP. Next, those who
indicated their interest to attend the CEPP received one of two follow-through prompts.5 They
were provided with either an informational package on CEPP sessions in the upcoming month
and a map with directions to the CEPP, or a preregistration package comprising the informational
4The Singapore Ministry of Home A↵airs is tasked with ensuring a safe and secure domestic environment for all
Singaporeans. It oversees several “Home Team” agencies, including the Singapore Police Force, Singapore Civil De-
fence Force, and Singapore Prison Service. For more information, see http://www.mha.gov.sg/overview.aspx?pageid=
187&secid=28.
5Note that residents who were not interested to attend the CEPP did not receive a follow-through prompt.
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package, a prompt to preregister to attend the CEPP, an appointment postcard, and a notification
that they might be contacted by the SCDF to share their feedback on the CEPP. The SCDF tracked
all residents’ subsequent attendance at the CEPP.
The findings demonstrate that contextual frames were significantly more e↵ective in increasing
residents’ interest to attend the CEPP, compared to an outright appeal. Specifically, including a
contextual frame increased the percentage of residents who were interested to attend the CEPP
by 72 percent (40.7 percent in the control group vs. 70 percent in the contextual frame treatment
groups). The communitarian frame (72.8 percent) was marginally more e↵ective than the self-
interest frame (67.6 percent) in increasing CEPP interest, though this di↵erence was statistically
insignificant. Contextual frames, however, proved insu cient in changing behaviors. Ninety-nine
percent of residents who had indicated their interest to attend the CEPP did not do so, thus revealing
a gap between intentions and behavior. By contrast, the findings for the follow-through prompts
were mixed. Receiving an informational package on upcoming CEPP sessions had a negligible
e↵ect on CEPP attendance, whereas receiving the preregistration package significantly increased
CEPP attendance. Specifically, 11.3 percent of those who received the preregistration package (and
15.7 percent of those who actually preregistered) attended the CEPP, compared to 1.3 percent for
the informational package treatment group and 0 percent for the control group. Interestingly, 22
percent of those who attended the CEPP brought their family members with them, so the reported
treatment e↵ects represent conservative estimates that do not account for possible network and
contagion e↵ects.
Overall, the most e↵ective behavioral intervention — contextual frame followed by the pre-
registration package — paired persuasive communication with a follow-through prompt that in-
corporated making a plan, commitment and reminder mechanisms, and social pressure. Its siz-
able e↵ect on CEPP attendance suggests that behavioral interventions that simultaneously target
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multiple psychological and cognitive barriers to behavioral change could have greater impact on
behavior, compared to those that focused only on a single barrier to behavioral change. Our pro-
posed intervention is similar to the planning prompt introduced in Milkman et al. (2011, 2012), but
goes a step further by linking the planning process with other intention-behavior bridging mech-
anisms. The preregistration package was only administered on residents who had expressed an
interest to attend the CEPP; these residents were prompted to make a concrete plan to attend the
CEPP, publicly commit to see their plan through by preregistering via the SCDF o cer, provided
with a visual reminder of their plan and commitment, and told that they might be contacted by the
SCDF for a follow-up survey. We obtained an intent-to-treat e↵ect of 11.3 percent, compared to
Milkman et al. (2012)’s 1 percent finding. More importantly, the proposed behavioral intervention
is nearly costless, easily integrated into existing public engagement campaigns, and designed to
address universal psychological and cognitive barriers to behavioral change. We therefore argue
that the experimental findings are applicable to public engagement campaigns across a wide range
of issues, and might even generalize to other settings.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 overviews emergency preparedness in
Singapore and describes the Community Emergency Preparedness Program and the post-fire blitz
campaign. Section 3 presents the theory on designing public engagement campaigns to change
behaviors. Section 4 describes the experimental design and timeline. Section 5 presents the data
and Section 6 outlines the evaluation strategy. Section 7 presents the findings. Section 8 concludes.
3.2 Emergency Preparedness in Singapore
Singapore is one of the most densely populated urban cities in the world, with a population den-
sity of 7,540 persons per square kilometer; about 5.4 million people live and work within a land
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area approximately 3.5 times the size of Washington, DC.6 Like any major urban city, Singapore
experiences its fair share of residential household fires, with approximately 3,000 residential fires
occurring in 2012 alone.7 The severity of these fires ranges from small kitchen fires caused by
residents who leave their cooking unattended to major fires that result in serious injury, loss of
life, and major damage to property. As 94.5 percent of Singaporean households live in high-rise
apartment buildings, there remains a persistent risk that even small fires could spiral out of control.
Reducing the number of residential fires and inculcating in the civilian population an awareness of
fire safety therefore rank highly among the SCDF’s priorities.
Generally, a civilian population that has cultivated an appreciation for the importance of emer-
gency preparedness and received training on how to react during an emergency situation is less
vulnerable and more resilient when faced with emergencies. Emergencies encompass fire related
hazards, natural disasters, and other types of life-threatening scenarios. In the case of fires, people
who have received emergency training are more likely to take action to minimize their suscepti-
bility to fires, such as fireproofing their home and maintaining a portable fire extinguisher. They
are also better prepared to react quickly and decisively during an actual fire, therefore increasing
their odds of survival and minimizing the impact of the fire. Moreover, there are positive exter-
nalities that arise from training citizens to deal with emergencies — citizens who are equipped
with emergency preparedness skills, such as knowing how to operate a fire extinguisher or perform
basic first aid, could render assistance to their neighbors and fellow citizens before first respon-
ders arrive, possibly saving lives.8 The Ministry of Home A↵airs (MHA) and the Singapore Civil
Defence Force (SCDF) therefore endeavor to raise the overall level of emergency preparedness
among Singapore residents.
6For information on Washington, DC, see http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/11000.html. For the 2013 figures
on Singapore’s population density, see http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/latest data.html.
7See Seehttp://data.gov.sg/common/search.aspx?q=fire&s=default&cs=1&page=1.
8See the following newspaper articles for examples: http://www.tnp.sg/news/
quick-thinking-workers-save-restaurant and http://www.tnp.sg/news/if-not-him-i-would-have-died.
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Public engagement campaigns comprise the main thrust of the Singapore government’s e↵orts
to persuade and educate citizens about the importance of emergency preparedness. These include
both passive appeals and active community engagement e↵orts. Government agencies and political
leaders issue press releases on emergency preparedness9; the local news media occasionally run
feature articles on citizens putting their emergency training to good use10; politicians promote
emergency preparedness initiatives that they have launched on social media.11 The SCDF also
actively outreaches to schools and companies, partnering with them to organize workshops for
their students and employees.12
3.2.1 The Community Emergency Preparedness Program
Launched in September 2003, the Community Emergency Preparedness Program (CEPP) is a full
day, “instructional, face-to-face public education program” o↵ered free-of-charge by the SCDF
at designated fire stations throughout the year. All residents of Singapore are eligible to partic-
ipate. The CEPP aims to equip participants with the skills to deal e↵ectively with emergency
situations when they arise, while waiting for first responders to arrive. It comprises five modules:
basic first aid, one-man cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and automated external defibrillator
(AED), fire safety and casualty evacuation, emergency procedures, and terrorism.13 Each module
is designed to impart theoretical knowledge and provide practical training. Participants have the
flexibility to complete the five modules in a single day, or over several days. They receive the
9http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/specialreports/parliament/news/emergency-preparedness-pl/251108.
html
10http://www.tnp.sg/news/passers-rescue
11See Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loongs Facebook Page for pictures of the Emergency Prepared-
ness Exercise at Hougang Street 92: https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.745505925512116.1073741983.
125845680811480&type=1
12http://m.hometeam.sg/article.aspx?news sid=201307119KhQc286aXUK
13For detailed information on the CEPP training and access to the course notes, please visit the follow-
ing website: http://www.scdf.gov.sg/content/scdf internet/en/community-and-volunteers/community-preparedness/
community-programmes/cepp.html.
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course notes and a certificate of attendance upon completion of all 5 CEPP modules.
Despite the SCDF’s best e↵orts to engage the public on emergency preparedness issues, overall
levels of emergency preparedness and public enrollment in the CEPP remain low. For example,
the 2010 SCDF Public Perception Survey found that only 23 percent of sampled residential house-
holds maintain a fire extinguisher at home; only 5 percent of sampled residential households have
installed smoke detectors at home. Most CEPP participants are solicited from organized groups
such as schools and companies; only a handful comprise members of the public who attend as
walk-ins.14
Several factors could account for the aforementioned gap between the public’s attitudes and be-
haviors toward emergency preparedness, though it is not within the scope of this study to discuss
them in detail. That said, lack of issue salience and high initial investment costs arguably rank as
important factors. Singapore has no natural disasters and has one of the lowest crime rates in the
world (Singh 2000). The government is widely regarded as extremely e cient and its emergency
services enjoy a high degree of confidence from the public. The absence of natural disasters, ex-
tremely low frequency of experienced emergencies, and a trusted and e cient emergency service
collectively lead people to heavily discount the likelihood of residential fires occurring to them-
selves or their loved ones.15 Many Singaporean residents therefore do not consider emergency
preparedness training to be a salient part of their everyday lives. Moreover, attending the CEPP
requires costly time investment — the average working adult would have to set aside a full day
on a weekend to attend the CEPP. Consequently, to the average person, participating in the CEPP
means making a costly time investment upfront, in exchange for what he deems as benefits that
14MHA briefing, dated July 24, 2014.
15The tendency to evaluate the probability of events by the ease with which they come to mind (e.g., from personal
experience, or recall from a newspaper article that one has read) is known as the availability heuristic. See Tversky and
Kahneman (1973, 1974), Schwarz et al. (1991), and Kahneman (2003a). Hertwig et al. (2004) argue that people who
make decisions based on personal experience tend to make riskier choices because they underweight the probability
of rare events occurring.
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would occur for an extremely low probability event in the future. Most people would therefore
choose not to participate in the CEPP.
3.2.2 The Post-Fire Blitz Campaign
The post-fire blitz is a community engagement e↵ort undertaken by the SCDF in the immediate
aftermath of a significant residential fire occurring within an apartment building.16 It aims to inform
residents about the fire and share with them fire safety tips. It comprises an onsite information
exhibit held at the lobby of the apartment building and a door-to-door visit of all households by
SCDF o cers and a civilian team comprising grassroots emergency response volunteers. The
blitz provides SCDF o cers and grassroots volunteers with the opportunity to interact and build
rapport with residents, increase their awareness about fire hazards, and interest them in learning
more about fire safety procedures. Note that prior to the experiment, the SCDF had yet to leverage
the post-fire blitz platform to advertise the CEPP to residential households; it had not explicitly
linked its messaging in the post-fire blitz with attendance at the CEPP.
The SCDF selected the post-fire blitz campaign as the platform to increase CEPP attendance,
for two reasons. First, the recency and severity of the apartment building fire imply that fire safety
would still weigh heavily on residents’ minds; it would become a salient issue, albeit temporarily.
From a policy perspective, leveraging the SCDF’s post-fire blitz campaign to encourage attendance
at the CEPP means engaging with a more receptive pool of residents, relative to other contexts
where fire is not a salient issue. Even without the behavioral modifications to the post-fire blitz,
we would expect a pure appeal to attend the CEPP to yield a greater proportion of CEPP atten-
dees. From a research design perspective, the post-fire blitz represents a “hard test case” (George
and Bennett 2005) for evaluating the behavioral modifications. Because of high issue salience,
16The SCDF categorizes fires as significant if they involve injuries or deaths, or cause significant alarm to residents.
Note that the SCDF only conducts post-fire blitzes for significant fires.
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we would expect the baseline rate of CEPP interest and attendance to be higher in the post-fire
blitz control group, relative to the control group baseline rates in other contexts with lower issue
salience. This suggests that the average treatment e↵ect of the behavioral modifications on CEPP
interest and attendance would be smaller in the post-fire blitz.
Second, the proposed behavioral modifications to the post-fire blitz could easily be adopted
across all future post-fire blitzes in Singapore, should they prove e↵ective in increasing CEPP at-
tendance rates among residential households in our study. In our opinion, the findings from applied
research in the field setting should ideally translate into real world, policy-relevant implications of
the form: “research establishes these findings, so this is what the next iteration of our policy should
look like”. Evaluating the e↵ects of the behavioral modifications in the lab might lead us to the
same conclusions, but the immediate applicability to policymakers is less obvious. The post-fire
blitz represents an ongoing community engagement e↵ort by the SCDF, so it serves as a natural
platform for pilot testing the e↵ects of the aforementioned behavioral modifications.
3.3 Theory: Designing Public Engagement Campaigns To Change
Behavior
Successful public engagement campaigns change how people think and behave. The proposed
behavioral modifications to the post-fire blitz must therefore go beyond merely eliciting interest
to attend the CEPP; they must also increase CEPP attendance rates. To achieve those objectives,
the SCDF selected a combination of contextual frames and follow-through prompts. All residents
first received a contextual frame that highlighted how they would benefit from attending the CEPP
(getting people to say yes). They were then asked if they would be interested to attend the CEPP.
Finally, interested residents received a follow-through prompt nudging them to attend the CEPP
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(getting those who say yes to take action).
Public opinion scholars have demonstrated that subtle variations in how information is framed
can lead to large changes in attitudes and knowledge about an issue.17 Frames serve as a “central
organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue” (Gamson and
Modigliani 1989); they “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient
in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal in-
terpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman
1993).18
The SCDF built on the aforementioned ideas and designed contextual frames to help residents
make sense of the recent fire in their apartment building, so as to increase their interest in and
attendance at the CEPP. Specifically, the contextual frames drew a link between knowledge of fire
safety and likelihood of escaping fires unharmed, and made salient to residents how they would
benefit from attending the CEPP. Self-interest frames emphasized how residents and their family
would benefit from their attending the CEPP, whereas communitarian frames highlighted how their
community would benefit. Note that the communitarian frame sought to simultaneously appeal
to various motivations for prosocial behavior, such as pure altruism (deriving satisfaction from
improving the welfare of others), impure altruism (deriving satisfaction from the act of helping,
without concern for the recipients welfare), social image (the desire to maintain a reputation as
a contributing member of society), and self-image (the desire to conform to ones identity as a
contributing member to society).19 To increase the e↵ectiveness of the contextual frames, residents
were also primed to think about the e↵ects of the fire from either a self-interested or communitarian
17See Entman (1993) and Chong and Druckman (2007) for an overview of the framing e↵ects literature. Benford
and Snow (2000) reviews how message frames influence collective action movements.
18Quotations from Nelson, Oxley and Clawson (1997).
19For an overview of the prosocial behavior literature, see Benabou and Tirole (2003). See Andreoni, Harbaugh
and Vesterlund (2007) and Becker (1974) for a more detailed exposition on pure altruism; Andreoni (1989) for impure
altruism; Benabou and Tirole (2006) for self-image, and Ariely, Bracha and Meier (2009) for social image.
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perspective. Residents who received the self-interest frame were asked to think about the actions
they would take if a fire were to break out in their own apartment while they were at home with
their family; residents who received the communitarian frame were asked to think about the actions
they would take if a fire were to break out in their neighbor’s apartment while they were at home
with their family. See Appendix B-1 for more information.
Overall, we hypothesized that contextual frames would influence CEPP interest as follows:
(1) Residents who receive a contextual frame are more likely to express interest in at-
tending the CEPP, relative to those who receive only an outright appeal (no contextual
frame).
(2) Residents who receive a communitarian frame are more likely to express interest
in attending the CEPP, relative to those who receive a self-interest frame.
Message frames could succeed in changing attitudes toward an issue but ultimately have a neg-
ligible e↵ect on behaviors (Sheeran 2002; Bartels 2005; Sniehotta, Scholz and Schwarzer 2005).
Several psychological and cognitive mechanisms account why people often fail to act on their in-
tentions. Sometimes, prohibitive information search costs serve as a costly cognitive barrier that
prevents people from taking actions that would benefit them in the longer term (Jones 2010).20
People could also have time-inconsistent preferences — they overly discount the future and there-
fore agree to undertake costly actions in the future, but renege on that undertaking when the time
comes because the action turns out to be costlier than they had anticipated (Ainslie 1975; Hoch and
Loewenstein 1991; Loewenstein 1996; Laibson 1997). The absence of a firm deadline to compel
people to take immediate action could also lead them to procrastinate (O’Donoghue and Rabin
1999a,b; Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002; Milkman, Rogers and Bazerman 2008), or they could
20Such cognitive constraints on rational decision-making have led to models of bounded rationality. See Simon
(1955), Conlisk (1996) and Kahneman (2003a,b). For the canonical work on the role of information in decision-
making, see Stigler (1961).
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simply forget (Schachter 1999).
The SCDF designed follow-through prompts to further engage residents who had indicated an
interest to attend the CEPP, with the aim of transforming their interest into actual attendance at the
CEPP. The follow-through prompts were meant to be relatively costless interventions that would
bridge the psychological and cognitive gaps between intentions and behavior.
The SCDF focused on two follow-through prompts: the informational package and the prereg-
istration package. The informational package comprised a printed schedule on upcoming CEPP
sessions and a map with directions to the CEPP. See Figures 3.1 and 3.2 below. In theory, the
information package would eliminate the costs of information acquisition — having to search for
information on the CEPP online — because it contained all the relevant information that residents
would need to make a plan to attend a future CEPP session. This in turn would allow residents
to focus their limited attention on analyzing the new information on the importance of fire safety
presented in the contextual frames.21 However, the provision of information often does not change
behavior (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
Figure 3.1: Information Package: Printed Map With Directions to CEPP Locations
21For experimental evidence of how people acquire and process information, see Gabaix et al. (2006).
80
Chapter 3. Leveraging Behavioral Insights to Improve the E cacy of Public Engagement
Campaigns: Experimental Evidence from Singapore
Figure 3.2: Information Package: Printed Information Schedule on Upcoming CEPP Sessions
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Figure 3.3: Appointment Postcard Provided to Respondents Who Preregistered for the CEPP
By contrast, the preregistration package comprised the informational package, a prompt to
preregister to attend the CEPP, an appointment postcard, and a notification that they might be
contacted by the SCDF to share their feedback on the CEPP. See Figure 3.3 above.
The preregistration package combined several behavioral interventions — making a concrete
plan (Sniehotta, Scholz and Schwarzer 2005; Rogers et al. 2011; Milkman et al. 2012), com-
mitment mechanisms (Thaler and Shefrin 1981; Schelling 1984, 1992; Burn and Oskamp 1986;
Wertenbroch 1998), and reminder prompts (Milkman et al. 2011; Vervloet et al. 2012) — to nudge
interested residents to attend the CEPP. When interested residents were presented with the sched-
ule of upcoming CEPP sessions and asked to preregister, they were compelled to mentally search
for a time-slot that would best fit their schedules. Next, they had to make a verbal commitment
to attend the CEPP. They then received an appointment postcard a rming the plan that they have
committed to. The postcard served as a visual reminder of their personal plan and commitment to
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attend the CEPP. Finally, the possibility of being contacted by the SCDF in the future entrenched
that commitment by holding residents accountable to their promise to take action. Note that these
interventions match the following recommendations for increasing the potency of plan-making, a
type of follow-through prompt (Rogers et al. 2011): the recipient has indicated an intention to ac-
complish a goal; a concrete plan; public declaration of the plan; the planning process requires the
recipient to mentally walk-through how to overcome obstacles to accomplishing the goal; limited
time window to act.
Overall, we hypothesized that follow-through prompts would influence CEPP interest as fol-
lows:
(3) Residents who receive an informational package are more likely to attend the
CEPP, relative to those who receive no follow-through prompt.
(4) Residents who receive a preregistration package are more likely to attend the CEPP,
relative to those who receive no follow-through prompt.
Note that the sequencing of the behavioral modifications mattered from both theoretical and
practical standpoints. Theoretically, designing e↵ective message frames to influence attitudes is
important because intent is a crucial prerequisite for behavioral change (Azjen and Fishbein 1980;
Abraham and Sheeran 2000; Wallston and Armstrong 2002); people must first internalize the mes-
sage frame before deciding to take action (Rothman and Salovey 1997). The first step would
therefore involve persuading residents of the need to attend the CEPP. People, however, often fail
to act on their intentions, so the subsequent step would involve nudging interested residents to
follow-through on their intentions. Practically, it made sense to administer the follow-through
prompts only on residents who had indicated an interest to attend the CEPP — the follow-through
prompts were designed to bridge the gap between intentions and behavior, so residents who re-
mained unconvinced on the need to attend the CEPP would have found them redundant.
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3.4 Experimental Design
This section motivates the experimental design, which sought to evaluate whether behavioral mod-
ifications to the SCDFs post-fire blitz campaign — in the form of contextual framing and follow-
through prompts — could increase interest in and attendance rates at the CEPP. We first detail the
experimental design and treatments. We then present the experimental timeline.
3.4.1 Experimental Design: Random Assignment to Treatments
The ideal experimental design would comprise a sequential randomization. All residents would
first be randomly assigned to either a study or control group. The control group would receive
only an outright appeal to attend the CEPP. All residents assigned to the study group would receive
either a self-interest frame or communitarian frame. They would then be asked if they would
be interested to attend the CEPP. Those who were interested to attend the CEPP would then be
randomly assigned to receive either an informational package or preregistration package, whereas
those who were uninterested to attend the CEPP would receive no follow-through prompt. The
SCDF would track the attendance of all residents for up to a month after the experiment. Figure
3.4 below summarizes.
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It is important to note that such an experimental design is akin to conducting two separate ex-
periments on di↵erent subsets of residents. The first experiment would examine the e↵ect of con-
textual frames on CEPP interest and attendance, on all residents. The second experiment would
examine the e↵ect of follow-through prompts on CEPP attendance, on the subset of residents who
had indicated interest to attend the CEPP. The residents who were interested to attend the CEPP
had essentially self-selected into the second experiment, so they might di↵er in some character-
istics from residents who were uninterested to attend the CEPP. To the extent that these di↵ering
characteristics influence attendance at the CEPP, then comparing follow-through prompt recipients
(who were interested to attend the CEPP) with control group residents and residents who were
uninterested to attend the CEPP would produce biased estimates of the causal e↵ect of the follow-
through prompts. In the subsequent section, we define the comparison groups in our empirical
evaluation of the follow-through prompts, and discuss the generalizability of the findings beyond
the current experiment.
In practice, the SCDF was unable to implement the ideal experimental design because they
lacked the resources and know-how to perform on the spot randomization of residents to the follow-
through prompts; it would be impossible to randomly assign residents to receive the follow-through
prompts prior to the post-fire blitz because the SCDF did not know ex-ante which residents would
be interested to attend the CEPP. Instead, the SCDF assumed that all residents were of the same
type — interested to attend the CEPP — and adopted a 2 X 2 factorial design (Factor 1: Contex-
tual Frame — self-interest vs. communitarian; Factor 2: Follow-through Prompt — informational
package vs. preregistration package).22 The various factor combinations yielded four treatment
groups: Treatment Group 1 was assigned to receive the self-interest frame and informational pack-
age; Treatment Group 2 was assigned to receive the self-interest frame and preregistration package;
22See Fisher (1935), Friedman and Sunder (1994), and Box, Hunter and Hunter (2005) for more information on
factorial designs.
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Treatment Group 3 was assigned to receive the communitarian frame and informational package;
Treatment Group 4 was assigned to receive the communitarian frame and preregistration package.
The control group was assigned to receive only an outright appeal to participate in the CEPP, with
no contextual frame or follow-up prompt. Table 3.1 below summarizes.
Table 3.1: The 2 X 2 Factorial Design
The SCDF implemented a cluster-randomized design with the residential floor as the unit of
randomization.23 They randomly assigned residential floors within each post-fire blitz apartment
building to either one of the four treatments or control, so that all households within the same
residential floor received the same treatment assignment.24 This approach to randomization meant
that the SCDF o cers were aware of the treatment protocol they had to deliver to residents, prior
to commencing the post-fire blitz. They would administer the follow-through prompts to residents
interested to attend the CEPP, but withhold delivery of the follow-through prompts if residents
were uninterested to attend the CEPP. Figure 3.5 below summarizes.
23See Donner and Klar (2004) and Green and Vavreck (2008). Some economists refer to cluster randomized designs
as group randomized trials. See Moulton (1986), Angrist and Lavy (2009), Angrist, Lang and Oreopoulos (2009).
24If a particular apartment block has ten floors, then the treatment groups and the control would each receive two
floors worth of residential households. If the number of residential floors within the apartment block is not a multiple
of 5, then we implement a completely randomized design for the number of floors equivalent to the largest multiple of
5 possible, and adopt a Bernoulli randomization (p=0.2) for the additional floors.
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Randomizing by residential floor, rather than households, made sense for design reasons. Res-
idents living in a particular apartment building were more likely to share similar demographic
characteristics, compared to residents living in di↵erent apartment buildings. Randomizing at ei-
ther the individual-level or residential floor-level would allow the SCDF to account for possible
within-block homogeneity by including residents from the same building across all the treatment
and control groups, thereby improving balance in both observable and unobservable characteris-
tics across the treatment and control groups in expectation. Cluster randomization, however, better
ensured that the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumptions (SUTVA) of non-interference and no-
hidden variation in treatment were satisfied.25 Non-interference could occur when experimental
units that received di↵erent treatments interact with each other. In our case, contamination might
take place because residents could discuss the specifics of the SCDFs communications during the
post-fire blitz with each other, which would in turn influence the potential outcomes associated
with the treatment assignments, and hence the estimates of the average treatment e↵ect.26 Resi-
dents living next to each other were more likely to interact with each other, compared to residents
living on di↵erent floors. Randomization at the residential-floor level therefore minimized the
possibility of contamination.
Additionally, violations to the no-hidden variation in treatment assumption generally occur
when administering the treatment. Slight variations in treatment delivery e↵ectively change the
number of treatment groups in the study, which in turn influences the definition of the causal
estimand of interest. Randomizing by floors would reduce confusion among the SCDF o cers who
deliver the treatment protocols, since they would deliver the same treatment to several apartment
25SUTVA is part of the Rubin Causal Model and is necessary for making valid causal inferences in a randomized
experiment. See Holland (1986) and Rubin (1974, 2005).
26For example, a resident who received the communitarian contextual frame and was preregistered for the CEPP
could meet with a resident assigned to the control group and share with him information on the upcoming CEPP
sessions. The resident assigned to the control group then decides to participate in the CEPP together with his neighbor.
The proportion of CEPP attendees in the control group rises and the estimated treatment e↵ect falls.
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units on each floor, rather than having to vary the treatments for each apartment unit.27
3.4.2 Experimental Timeline
Table 3.2 below outlines the experimental timeline, which was divided into the pre-blitz phase,
during blitz phase, and post-blitz phase.
The pre-blitz phase began when a major fire broke out at a residential apartment building. The
SCDF assigned a team of o cers to prepare for a post-fire blitz at the a↵ected apartment building.
At this stage, residential floors in the apartment building were assigned to one of the four treatment
groups or control group.
The during blitz phase commenced on the day of the post-fire blitz. SCDF o cers began by
informing residents of the recent fire. The SCDF o cers then administered the contextual frames.
Next, residents were asked whether they would be interested to attend the CEPP. Finally, the SCDF
o cers administered the follow-though prompt treatments to residents who had indicated their in-
terest to attend the CEPP. Residents who were uninterested to attend the CEPP did not receive a
follow-through prompt. All respondents were asked to complete a brief survey to collect demo-
graphic information and their attitudes toward emergency preparedness.28 See Appendix B-2 for a
description of the data collected.
In the post-blitz phase, the SCDF tracked attendance at the CEPP for up to a month after the
post-fire blitz. We assumed that respondents who did not turn up for the CEPP within the one-
27To ensure that the SCDF o cers assigned to the post-fire blitz implement the treatments consistently, the Ministry
of Home A↵airs conducted two training sessions, during which they practiced delivering the treatments to each other.
The SCDF o cers also rehearse their delivery of the treatments prior to beginning the door-to-door visits at the a↵ected
apartment blocks.
28In theory, randomization ensures that the treatment and control groups are, on average, similar across both ob-
servable and unobservable characteristics. However, there still exists the possibility that the particular randomizations
we have drawn for our experiment result in treatment and control groups that di↵er on some characteristics. SCDF
therefore conducted a brief face-to-face survey at the end of the experiment to collect background covariates that
might a↵ect the outcomes of interest. These background covariates allow us to check that randomization was properly
implemented, and to allow us to use statistical adjustment if covariates were imbalanced.
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month window were unlikely to do so subsequently.
Table 3.2: The Experimental Timeline
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3.5 The Experimental Data
This section describes the experimental data from four post-fire blitzes that were held between
January and April of 2014. We begin with an overview of the data. We then evaluate whether
randomization achieved balance in observed covariates across the treatment and control groups of
interest.
3.5.1 Overview of Data
Four major residential fires occurred between Jan 2014 and April 2014 at apartment blocks in the
Houngang, Compassvale, Choa Chu Kang, and Pinnacle districts. The SCDF conducted a total of
four post-fire blitzes and interviewed a total of 268 residents living on 88 residential floors. The
outcomes of interest were CEPP interest and CEPP attendance. Approximately 20 percent of the
residents were assigned to each of the five treatment groups, which suggest that the randomization
was properly implemented.29 Table 3.3 below summarizes.
Table 3.3: Randomization Across Treatment Groups
Several demographic characteristics of the post-fire blitz respondents di↵ered from those of the
national population’s. Post-fire blitz respondents were on average older and more educated, more
29The numbers of respondents assigned to each treatment group are not exact because some respondents were not
home when the interviewers visited. SCDF revisited these households a second time, and if they were still not home,
they were excluded from the analysis.
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likely to be male, and had larger households. For the post-fire blitz sample, 55.6 percent were male
and 83.9 percent were Singaporean citizens; the median age was 40.3 and the average household
size was 4.25; Chinese comprised 70.9 percent, Malays 9 percent, Indians 14.9 percent, and other
races 5.2 percent; 86.19 percent had received a secondary education or higher, and 98.5 percent
of residents lived in a 3-room/4-room/5-room flat. By contrast, in the national population, 49.2
percent were male and 86.2 percent were Singaporean citizens; the median age was 38.9 and the
average household size was 3.47; Chinese comprised 74.2 percent, Malays 13.3 percent, Indians
9.2 percent, and other races 3.3 percent; 68.8 percent had received a secondary education or higher,
and 92.9 percent of residents lived in a 3-room/4-room/5-room flat. Table 3.4 below summarizes.
Table 3.4: Comparison of Demographic Profile of Post-Fire Blitz Sample and National Population
Note that the post-fire blitz sample’s lack of representativeness did not concern us. Our main
objective was to examine how the SCDF could leverage behavioral nudges to increase CEPP at-
tendance, so what mattered more was that the findings generalized to the population of major
fire-prone apartment buildings. If anything, if there were indeed systematic di↵erences in demo-
graphic characteristics between apartment blocks with major fires and apartment blocks without
major fires or no fires, then policy interventions targeted at residents from “at risk” apartment
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blocks would arguably yield greater overall impact.
3.5.2 Evaluating Covariate Balance Across Treatment and Control Groups
In theory, randomization would ensure that the treatment and control groups were, on average,
similar across both observable and unobservable characteristics. However, there still existed the
possibility that the particular randomizations drawn for the experiment would result in imbalanced
treatment and control groups. The SCDF therefore conducted a brief face-to-face exit survey to
collect information on residents’ demographics and attitudes toward emergency preparedness, as
these might influence the outcomes of interest. These background covariates would allow us to
check whether randomization achieved balance across the treatment and control groups, and to use
statistical adjustment when estimating the causal e↵ects of interest if balance were not achieved.
See Appendix B-2 for a description of the dataset.
We had noted in Section 4.1 that the experimental design was akin to conducting two separate
experiments on di↵erent subsets of residents. The first experiment examined the e↵ect of contex-
tual frames on CEPP interest and attendance, on all residents. The second experiment examined the
e↵ect of follow-through prompts on CEPP attendance, on the subset of residents who had indicated
interest to attend the CEPP. Consequently, the relevant treatment and control groups would di↵er
when evaluating the e↵ect of contextual frames and follow-through prompts. For estimating the
causal e↵ect of contextual frames, we focused on the self-interest treatment group (all residents in
Treatment Groups 1 and 2), the communitarian treatment group (all residents in Treatment Groups
3 and 4), and the control group (all residents in Treatment Group 5). By contrast, for estimating
the causal e↵ect of follow-through prompts, we focused on the informational treatment group (the
subset of residents in Treatment Groups 1 and 3 who were interested to attend the CEPP), the
preregistration treatment group (the subset of residents in Treatment Groups 2 and 4 who were
94
Chapter 3. Leveraging Behavioral Insights to Improve the E cacy of Public Engagement
Campaigns: Experimental Evidence from Singapore
interested to attend the CEPP), and the control group (all residents in Treatment Group 5). Table
3.5 below summarizes.
Table 3.5: Overview of Treatment and Control Groups
To verify that randomization had successfully achieved balance across the treatment and con-
trol groups, we implemented both univariate and multivariate balance diagnostics. The univariate
balance diagnostics comprised a di↵erence-in-means and corresponding two-sample t-test with un-
equal variances, and a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test.30 We considered a covariate
imbalanced if the p-values from both the two-sample t-test and KS test were significant at the 5
percent level. The multivariate balance check comprised a regression of a trichotomous treatment
variable that indicates assignment to one of the three treatment groups (e.g., control group/self-
interest frame/communitarian frame) on the demographic and emergency preparedness covariates.
We considered the covariates to be imbalanced if they were jointly significant in predicting the
trichotomous treatment variable.
Overall, the balance diagnostics suggest that randomization achieved experimental balance
across all the relevant groupings of interest: (1) self-interest treatment group vs. control group, (2)
communitarian treatment group vs. control group; (3) informational treatment group vs. control
group; (4) preregistration treatment group vs. control group. See Appendix B-3.
30See Mao and Vreeland (2012, 2013) for an example on reporting balance diagnostics.
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3.6 Evaluation Strategy
In this section, we discuss our strategy for estimating the causal e↵ect of: (1) contextual frames
on CEPP interest and CEPP attendance, and (2) follow-through prompts on CEPP attendance.
We begin with a discussion on one-sided noncompliance among residents assigned to receive the
preregistration package treatment. Next, we describe our approach to estimating causal e↵ects of
interest under cluster randomization. Finally, we outline the overall strategy for estimating the
causal e↵ects of interest.
3.6.1 One-Sided Noncompliance
Noncompliance occurs when a subset of residents fail to comply with their treatment assignment,
and instead receive an alternative treatment.31 There are three noncomplier types: (1) never-takers
who avoid taking their assigned treatment, no matter which treatment they are assigned to; (2)
always-takers who take the assigned treatment, no matter which treatment they are assigned to; (3)
defiers who do the opposite of their treatment assignment.
One-sided noncompliance occurs when a subset of residents that are assigned to receive the
treatment receive the control instead; all residents assigned to the control comply with their treat-
ment assignment. Such a scenario could occur because the experimenters exercise control over
which residents obtain access to the control, but have to rely on the willingness of respondents to
take up the treatment. During the experiment, the SCDF encountered one-sided noncompliance
among the residents assigned to receive the preregistration package: only 71.8 percent of them
agreed to preregister for the CEPP. All other residents complied with their treatment assignments.
Table 3.6 below summarizes.
31See Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) for an overview of the framework for causal inference under a scenario of
binary treatment assignment ignorability but imperfect compliance (treatment receipt ignorability).
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Table 3.6: One-Sided Noncompliance Among Residents Assigned to Receive the Preregistration Package
In the analyses that follow, we estimate both the intent-to-treat (ITT) e↵ect and the complier
average treatment e↵ect (CATE). The ITT measures the e↵ect of being assigned to the preregis-
tration package on CEPP attendance, without regard for whether residents actually preregistered.
The CATE measures the e↵ect of actually preregistering for the CEPP on CEPP attendance. The
ITT is arguably of greater interest to policymakers as they can determine whether to include pre-
registration in their future community engagement e↵orts, but cannot compel target recipients to
actually go through with the preregistration process. The ITT therefore provides a lower bound
estimate of the expected impact on CEPP attendance rates, should the SCDF decide to implement
the planning/commitment/reminder prompt across all future post-fire blitzes. Note that estimating
the ITT does not require us to make further assumptions beyond the SUTVA assumptions referred
to in Section 3.4.
By contrast, the CATE is arguably of greater interest to academics because it measures the
e↵ect of actually preregistering on CEPP attendance. Following the Angrist, Imbens and Rubin
(1996) framework, we assume monotonicity to exclude the subpopulation of defiers. This seems
reasonable because there is no obvious reason that there would be defiers within the context of our
study, i.e., respondents who would insist on preregistering upon receiving information on upcom-
ing CEPP sessions. Further, we assume the exclusion restrictions hold for the subpopulation of
always-takers and never-takers — receiving the pre-registration prompt has no e↵ect on the poten-
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tial outcomes, i.e., attending the CEPP. Along with the SUTVA assumptions outlined in Section
3.4, we can then therefore use the instrumental variables estimand to estimate the CATE.
To the extent that the noncompliers resemble the compliers, then the CATE serves as an upper
bound of the ITT— the ITT equals the CATEwhen all those who are assigned to the preregistration
package treatment comply with the preregistration request. Though the SCDF o cers cannot force
residents to preregister for the CEPP, there are techniques that they can adopt during the face-to-
face interview to improve the compliance rate with the preregistration request. We return to this
discussion in the conclusion section. Note that estimating the CATE requires us to assume several
exclusion restrictions.
Following Imbens and Rubin (2015), we did not implement per protocol analysis and as treated
analysis, because they generally produce biased estimates of the causal e↵ects of interest. Per
protocol analysis involves discarding units that fail to comply with their treatment assignment, and
then analyzing the remaining data as if they were generated from a randomized experiment with
perfect compliance. For our study, this means discarding those residents who were assigned the
preregistration package treatment but who refused to preregister (the noncompliers). The relevant
estimand of interest would be the CATE. However, since we cannot observe the compliance type
for residents assigned to the control group, we cannot discard the noncomplier types among the
control group residents. The per protocol estimator e↵ectively compares the compliers assigned to
the treatment with both compliers and noncompliers assigned to the control, and therefore produces
biased estimates of the CATE (Imbens and Rubin 2015).
As treated analysis involves analyzing the data as if the treatments that residents actually re-
ceived were the treatments that they were assigned to. In our case, this means re-categorizing the
preregistration noncompliers — who e↵ectively received the control treatment — as part of the
control group. The relevant estimand of interest would be the average treatment e↵ect (ATE). The
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receipt of treatment, however, is non-randomly assigned as the noncompliers had self-selected into
the control group. If the expected di↵erence in outcomes between the compliers and noncompliers
in the control group were di↵erent, then the as treated estimator would produce biased estimates
of the ATE.
3.6.2 Cluster Randomization and Causal Inference
Cluster randomization complicates causal inference because units within the same cluster could
share common “disturbances” (Green and Vavreck 2008). The presence of such intracluster corre-
lation implies that standard errors estimated from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression would
be downward biased, therefore increasing the likelihood of finding significant treatment e↵ects
when none exist (Murray 1998). As aptly noted by Cornfield (1978), “analyses of group random-
ized trials that ignore cluster are an exercise in self-deception”.
There exist two approaches to account for the intracluster correlation brought about from clus-
ter randomization at the residential floor level, each with its pros and cons.
First, we could aggregate the data at the residential floor level and treat each residential floor
as an observational unit. Averaging across individuals within each residential floor eliminates
intracluster variation, but causes the e↵ective sample size to shrink from nC ⇤ C units to C units,
where nC denotes the number of observations in cluster c and C the number of clusters.32 The
smaller sample size reduces the e ciency of the treatment e↵ect estimates, though the elimination
of the intracluster correlation generally o↵sets the e ciency loss (Green and Vavreck 2008). Under
this approach, the quantity of interest is the weighted-group treatment e↵ect of the behavioral
nudges on residential-floor level outcomes of interest. Individual-level covariates are excluded
32King et al. (2007) and Imai, King and Nall (2009a,b) propose using matched pairs in cluster randomized ex-
periments to increase the power of a small n-design. The SCDF did not adopt this approach because they lacked
background covariates of households in the post-fire blitz prior to treatment assignment.
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from the analysis.
Second, we could preserve the individual-level structure of the data and attempt to correct for
the intracluster correlation-induced downward bias in the standard errors. For example, we could
obtain unbiased OLS estimates of the treatment e↵ects and estimate robust cluster standard errors.
Alternatively, we could directly model the intracluster correlations using a random e↵ects logistic
regression, which assumes that the cluster-level e↵ects are drawn from a normal distribution with
finite and constant variance. Under this approach, the quantity of interest is the average treatment
e↵ect of the behavioral modifications on individual-level outcomes of interest. We could also in-
clude individual-level covariates to improve the precision of the average treatment e↵ect estimates.
For our purposes, we are ultimately interested in designing interventions to increase the in-
dividual’s interest in and participation at the CEPP. We therefore favor making inferences at the
individual-level, though we present findings using both aggregated and individual-level data.
3.6.3 Evaluation Strategy
We seek to evaluate the e↵ect of contextual frames (self-interest and communitarian) on CEPP
interest and CEPP attendance, and the e↵ect of follow-through prompts (informational and pre-
registration) on CEPP attendance. For each evaluation, we first present the OLS point estimates
of the average treatment e↵ects, for both the individual-level and cluster aggregated data, using
both standard and robust cluster standard errors. Note that for the evaluation of the preregistration
follow-through prompt, we estimate both the intent-to-treat e↵ect (ITT) and the complier aver-
age treatment e↵ect (CATE). Next, covariate imbalance might a↵ect the precision of the treatment
e↵ect point estimates. Additionally, to the extent that imbalance in observed covariates is corre-
lated with imbalance in unobserved characteristics, then we would have biased treatment e↵ect
estimates due to confoundedness of the unobserved characteristics with potential outcomes. We
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therefore include demographic and emergency preparedness covariates, as well as apartment block
fixed e↵ects in the OLS regressions.
3.7 Experimental Findings
In this section, we present the experimental findings. We first present the e↵ect of contextual
frames on CEPP interest and CEPP attendance. Next, we present the e↵ect of the follow-through
prompts on CEPP attendance. Finally, we examine interaction e↵ects — did the e↵ect of the
follow-through prompts vary depending on the contextual frame previously received?
3.7.1 Did Contextual Frames Increase CEPP Interest?
Contextual frames were significantly more e↵ective in increasing residents’ interest to attend the
CEPP, compared to an outright appeal. Specifically, including a contextual frame increased the
percentage of residents who were interested to attend the CEPP by 72 percent (40.7 percent in
the control group vs. 70 percent in the contextual frame treatment groups, a di↵erence of 29.4
percent). The communitarian frame (72.8 percent) was marginally more e↵ective than the self-
interest frame (67.6 percent) in increasing CEPP interest, though this di↵erence was statistically
insignificant. Figure 3.6 below summarizes.
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Figure 3.6: CEPP Interest Across Contextual Framing Groups
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Table 3.7: The E↵ect of Contextual Framing on CEPP Interest
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, and * at the 0.10 level.
We obtained similar estimated causal e↵ects under the model specification that include covari-
ates and apartment block fixed e↵ects (26.8 percent for the contextual frame treatment), as well as
the cluster-aggregated OLS (28.5 percent for the contextual frame treatment). See Table 3.7 above.
3.7.2 Did Contextual Frames Increase CEPP Attendance?
Overall, contextual frames had a negligible e↵ect in increasing CEPP attendance. None of the
residents in the control and communitarian treatment groups attended the CEPP; 1.8 percent of the
residents in the self-interest treatment group attended the CEPP, though this di↵erence was insignif-
icant at the 5 percent level. See Table 3.8 below, which summarizes the estimated causal e↵ects
of the di↵erent contextual frames under various model specifications. Moreover, we observed a
stark gap between stated intentions and actual behavior. Ninety-nine percent of the residents who
received a contextual frame treatment and indicated their interest to attend the CEPP did not turn
up; none of the residents who indicated their interest to attend the CEPP turned up (see Table 3.9).
103
Chapter 3. Leveraging Behavioral Insights to Improve the E cacy of Public Engagement
Campaigns: Experimental Evidence from Singapore
Table 3.8: The E↵ect of Contextual Framing on CEPP Attendance
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, and * at the 0.10 level.
Table 3.9: Intention-Behavior Gap Among Respondents
3.7.3 Did Follow-Through Prompts Increase CEPP Attendance?
By contrast, the findings for the follow-through prompts were mixed. Receiving an informational
package on upcoming CEPP sessions had a negligible e↵ect on CEPP attendance, whereas receiv-
ing the preregistration package significantly increased CEPP attendance. Specifically, 11.3 percent
of those who received the preregistration package attended the CEPP (estimated ITT), whereas
15.7 percent of those who actually preregistered attended the CEPP (estimated CATE). By com-
parison, 1.3 percent of those who received the informational package and none of those in the
control group attended the CEPP. Figure 3.7 below summarizes.
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Figure 3.7: CEPP Attendance Across the Follow-Through Prompt Treatment Groups
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Table 3.10: The E↵ect of Follow-Through Prompts on CEPP Attendance
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, and * at the 0.10 level.
We obtained similar estimated causal e↵ects for the preregistration package under the model
specification that included covariates and apartment block fixed e↵ects (estimated ITT of 14.3
percent and estimated CATE of 19.5 percent), as well as the cluster-aggregated OLS (estimated
ITT of 8.1 percent; CATE could not be estimated). See Table 3.10 above. Interestingly, 22 percent
of those who attended the CEPP brought their family members with them, so the reported treatment
e↵ects represent conservative estimates that do not account for possible network and contagion
e↵ects.
3.7.4 Interaction E↵ects: Contextual Frames and Preregistration Package
The e↵ect of the preregistration package appeared to vary according to the type of contextual frame
previously received. Residents who received the self-interest frame and preregistration package
were more likely to attend the CEPP, compared to those who received the communitarian frame and
preregistration package (ITT: 13.9 percent for self-interest frame vs. 8.6 percent for communitarian
frame; CATE: 17.2 percent for self-interest frame vs. 13.6 percent for communitarian frame).
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These di↵erences, however, were insignificant at the 5 percent level. Figure 3.8 below summarizes.
The left-hand side presents the ITT estimates; the right-hand side presents the CATE estimates.
Figure 3.8: CEPP Attendance Across the Engagement Prompt Treatment Groups
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3.8 Conclusion
Overall, the most e↵ective behavioral intervention — a contextual frame followed by the prereg-
istration package — paired persuasive communication with a follow-through prompt that incor-
porated making a plan, commitment and reminder mechanisms, and social pressure. Though our
study focused on residents living in fire-prone apartment buildings in Singapore, we argue that
the experimental findings are generally applicable to public engagement campaigns across a wide
range of issues, since they derive from behavioral interventions that were designed to address uni-
versal behavioral biases. More importantly, the proposed behavioral intervention is nearly costless
and easily integrated into existing public engagement campaigns. In our study, this involved: (1)
framing messages to emphasize how undertaking a specific action benefited the target respondent;
(2) eliciting the target respondent’s behavioral intent; (3) facilitating target respondents who had
indicated an interest to change their behavior to follow-through on their intentions, by prompting
them to make a plan and commit to that plan; (4) providing them with a visual reminder of their
plan and commitment; (5) using social pressure to entrench their commitment.
Judging from the size of the substantive e↵ects and the evidence of network and contagion
e↵ects, the proposed behavioral intervention that combines contextual frames with the preregis-
tration package could have potentially huge impact in shaping behaviors. The pilot experiment
encompassed four post-fire blitzes with 268 respondents; the proposed behavioral intervention
was implemented on 71 of the 268 respondents (26.5 percent of the sample). We had also con-
servatively estimated the intent-to-treat (ITT) e↵ect to be 11.3 percent and the complier average
treatment e↵ect (CATE) to be 15.7 percent.33 Suppose the SCDF were to adopt the proposed be-
havioral intervention across all future post-fire blitzes, and that there were 100 post-fire blitzes
annually. If the number of respondents remained approximately the same, then the SCDF would
33With further fine-tuning of the contextual frames, the impact could potentially be higher.
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have reached out to 6,700 respondents. The estimated number of CEPP attendees would therefore
range from 757 people to 1052 residents, compared to an estimated 0 attendees under the status
quo post-fire blitz.
We address several limitations of our study that arise from defining our outcome measure as
CEPP attendance. From a practical perspective, CEPP attendance is at best an indirect measure of
an individual’s level of emergency preparedness, which is the outcome of interest that the SCDF
and MHA ultimately seek to improve. The CEPP is a full-day, face-to-face public educational pro-
gram that provides participants with theoretical and practical training in emergency preparedness
skills. One would intuitively expect CEPP graduates to be more likely to undertake costly actions
to raise their emergency preparedness levels, such as fireproofing their homes, or assembling and
maintaining a first aid kit. They, however, su↵er from the same psychological and cognitive biases
that prevented the residents in our experiment who had indicated their interest to participate in the
CEPP from actually attending the CEPP. In other words, there is no guarantee that CEPP graduates
would internalize the lessons from the CEPP and apply their new knowledge to their everyday
lives.
Theoretically, attending the CEPP requires making a one-o↵, costly behavioral change. How-
ever, many real-life decisions (e.g., eating healthy, exercising), including raising emergency pre-
paredness levels, require repeated, sustained behavioral change over the longer-term. Allcott and
Rogers (2012) find that repeated interventions could sometimes generate sustained long-run be-
havioral change, and speculate that this arises because people learn new habits of behavior. Their
argument echoes previous research that finds that past past behavior predicts future behavior (Ouel-
lete and Wood 1998; Ajzen 2002). However, they also find that people repeatedly cycle through
action and inaction in response to repeated interventions. In other words, repeated interventions do
not guarantee sustained behavioral change. It therefore remains an open question in applied behav-
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ioral research as to whether and how behavioral nudges can induce long-term, sustained behavioral
change.
In conclusion, despite the limitations of our study, the success of the proposed behavioral
intervention in increasing CEPP attendance hints at the potential of incorporating nudges that si-
multaneously target multiple psychological and cognitive barriers to behavioral change into pub-
lic engagement campaigns. We aim to address the aforementioned shortcomings of our study in
two follow-up pilot experiments with the MHA and SCDF. The first examines which pedagogical
features increase the e cacy of the CEPP in imparting emergency preparedness skills to CEPP
participants in the short-term. The second explores whether CEPP participants maintain their level
of emergency preparedness over the longer term.
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Table A-3-1: Univariate Balance Diagnostics: Contextual Information Treatment Groups
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level and ** at the 0.05 level. We report the
means across treatment groups, di↵erence-in-means and corresponding two-sample t-test with unequal
variances, and the p-values from a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. We consider a covari-
ate imbalanced if the p-values from both the two-sample t-test and KS test suggest significance at the
5 percent level. The univariate balance diagnostics suggest that with the exception of the whether the
respondent donated in the past twelve months, there are no observable di↵erences between respondents
assigned to the self-interested frame treatment group and control group, at the 5 percent level of signifi-
cance.
124
Chapter 3. Leveraging Behavioral Insights to Improve the E cacy of Public Engagement
Campaigns: Experimental Evidence from Singapore
Table A-3-2: Univariate Balance Diagnostics: Motivational Frame Treatment Groups
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level and ** at the 0.05 level. We report the
means across treatment groups, di↵erence-in-means and corresponding two-sample t-test with unequal
variances, and the p-values from a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. We consider a covariate
imbalanced if the p-values from both the two-sample t-test and KS test suggest significance at the 5
percent level. The univariate balance diagnostics suggest that there are no observable di↵erences be-
tween respondents assigned to each of the motivational frame treatment group and control group, at the
5 percent level of significance.
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Table A-3-3: Multivariate Balance Diagnostics: Motivational Frame Treatment Groups
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level and ** at the 0.05 level. We report the
results from a formal multivariate balance check a regression of a trichotomous treatment variable that
indicates assignment to one of the three treatment groups (control group/pure altruism/self-image/self-
interest/impure altruism treatment) on the background covariates. The multivariate balance diagnostics
suggest balance overall; the covariates are jointly insignificant at the 5 percent level.
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Table B-3-1: Univariate Balance Diagnostics: Contextual Frame Treatment Groups
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level and ** at the 0.05 level. We report the
means across treatment groups, di↵erence-in-means and corresponding two-sample t-test with unequal
variances, and the p-values from a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. We consider a covariate
imbalanced if the p-values from both the two-sample t-test and KS test suggest significance at the 5
percent level. The univariate balance diagnostics suggest that with the exception of the neighborliness
covariate, there are no observable di↵erences between respondents assigned to the self-interested frame
treatment group and control group, at the 5 percent level of significance.
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Table B-3-2: Multivariate Balance Diagnostics: Contextual Frame Treatment Groups
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level and ** at the 0.05 level. The multivariate
balance diagnostics suggest no significant covariate imbalance — with the exception of the secondary
education variable, none of the covariates are individually significant, and the covariates are jointly
insignificant.
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Table B-3-3: Univariate Balance Diagnostics: Follow-Through Prompt Treatment Groups
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level and ** at the 0.05 level. We report the
means across treatment groups, di↵erence-in-means and corresponding two-sample t-test with unequal
variances, and the p-values from a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. We consider a covariate
imbalanced if the p-values from both the two-sample t-test and KS test suggest significance at the 5 per-
cent level. The univariate balance diagnostics suggest that there are no observable di↵erences between
respondents in the informational treatment group and control group, or the preregistration treatment
group and control group, at the 5 percent level of significance.
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Table B-3-4: Univariate Balance Diagnostics: Follow-Through Prompt Treatment Groups
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level and ** at the 0.05 level. We report the
results from a formal multivariate balance check — a regression of a trichotomous treatment vari-
able that indicates assignment to one of the three treatment groups (control group/informational treat-
ment/preregistration treatment) on the background covariates. The multivariate balance diagnostics sug-
gest some covariate imbalance. The secondary education variable and the apartment dummy variables
are significant for both the informational and preregistration treatments. The covariates, however, are
jointly insignificant at the 5 percent level (see Table 12b).
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